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REDLINING, DISINVESTMENT AND THE
ROLE OF MUTUAL SAVINGS BANKS:
A SURVEY OF SOLUTIONS
I. Introduction
In recent years, a fierce debate has arisen over the practice of
redlining' in mortgage lending. As a result of this debate, numer-
ous studies have been made,2 state and federal legislation has been
1. "Redlining" is best defined as:
[T]he denial of mortgage credit on properties located in certain geographic areas even
though the market value of the property is sufficient collateral and the applicant is
creditworthy, or the approval of mortgage credit on less favorable terms than those
granted on properties located in other areas even though the market value of the
property and the creditworthiness of the borrower are similar.
R. SCHAFER, MORTGAGE LENDING DECISIONS: CRITERIA AND CONSTRAINTS 1-10 (1978) JOINT
CENTER FOR URBAN STUDIES OF THE MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY AND HARVARD
UNIVERSITY [hereinafter cited as SCHAFER]. This definition will be referred to in this Com-
ment as redlining in the "strict sense" of the word.
The arbitrary criteria used by mortgage lenders to refuse loans may include not only the
race of residents in a neighborhood, but other factors such as the age of the housing stock,
and the location of the neighborhood. NYPIRG, SQUEEZING Us DRY: BANK REDLINING IN THE
BRONX 2 (1978) [hereinafter cited as SQUEEZING Us DRY]. SCHAFER supra, at 13-4.
. Methods by which loans may be effectively refused include: shortening the mortgage term;
raising the interest rate; requiring a higher down payment; raising closing costs; refusing to
approve loans for less than a certain minimum amount; lowering the percentage of the ap-
praised value for which the loan will be issued or under-appraising the property; requiring
the outstanding principal of a "billoon" mortgage to be paid immediately rather than roll-
ing it over or extending such a loan only at an exorbitant rate of interest; charging "front
end" fees to the loan applicant; and imposing a "due-on-sale" clause rather than allowing
the loan applicant to assume the obligations of an existing mortgage. If an institution habit-
ually employs these practices, people do not even submit applications to it for mortgages.
Thus the institution's denial is implicit rather than explicit. NYPIRG, TAKE THE MONEY
AND RUN: REDLINING IN BROOKLYN ii (1977) [hereinafter cited as TAKE THE MONEY AND
RUN]; Werner, Frej & Madway, Redlining & Disinvestment: Causes, Consequences & Pro-
posed Remedies, 10 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 501, 502 (1976); [hereinafter cited as Werner, Frej
& Madway]; Note, Attacking the Urban Redlining Problem, 56 B.U. L. REy. 989 (1976);
Comment, Red-Lining And The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975: A Decisive Step
Toward Private Urban Redevelopment, 25 EMORY L. REV. 667, 669-70 n.10 (1976).
2. SCHAFER, supra note 1, Werner, Frej & Madway, supra note 1, at 501; MIT-HARVARD
JOINT CENTER, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND NEIGHBORHOOD DECLINE: A REVIEW OF THE
LITERATURE (1974); NEW YORK STATE BANKING DEPARTMENT, MORTGAGE FINANCING AND
HOUSING MARKETS IN NEW YORK STATE: A PRELIMINARY REPORT (1977) [hereinafter cited as
N.Y.S. BANKING DEP'TJ. See generally G. LEYLAND, DETERMINING PRIORITIES OF NEED FOR
GUARANTEED MORTGAGE FUNDS (1976) [hereinafter cited as LEYLAND].
90 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. IX
enacted, s and regulations have been promulgated.4 The legislation
and regulations, in turn, have caused further controversy because
of their ambiguity and lack of a practicable means of enforcement.'
In this Comment, current federal and New York State laws and
regulations pertaining to redlining and disinvestment will be ana-
lyzed. In addition, the current problems facing mutual savings
banks, the primary lenders in the mortgage markets will be dis-
cussed and their role in the mortgage market will be examined.
Finally, proposals for future legislation to remedy the problems of
redlining, disinvestment, and the current problems of the mutual
savings banks will be discussed.
The word redlining is also used in a broad sense to mean geo-
graphic disinvestment.7 However, the practice of geographic disin-
3. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-200, 89 Stat. 1125 (codified at
12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2809 (1976)); Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128,
91 Stat. 1147 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901, 2903-2905 (Supp. II 1978)), 12 U.S.C. § 2902, as
amended by Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 1502, 92 Stit. 3713 (1978). Act of December 8, 1978, ch.
788, 1978 N.Y. LAWS (codified at N.Y. BANKING LAW § 9-f (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980)).
4. 12 C.F.R. § 345 (1980). Supervisory Procedure G-107 was promulgated pursuant to
N.Y. BANKING LAW §§ 10, 36(1), 36(3), 125(2) (McKinney 1971) [hereinafter cited as Super-
visory Procedure G-107].
5. See notes 14, 15, 24-28, 33-36, 69, 70, 72 infra.
6. N.Y.S. BANKING DEP'T, supra note 2, at 11-1.
7. The terms "redlining" and "neighborhood disinvestment" are often confused. See
TAKE THE MONEY AND RUN, supra note 1, at ii (1977). SQUEEZING Us DRY, supra note 1, at
1. Disinvestment refers to depository institutions' use of deposits to make mortgage loans
outside the neighborhoods where such deposits are made. Wisniewski, Mortgage Redlining
(Disinvestment): The Parameters of Federal, State, and Municipal Regulation, 54 J. URB.
L. 370 (1977). Disinvestment has also been defined as:
(1) Refusal to make mortgage and home improvement loans to credit-worthy people
in those city neighborhoods and older suburbs which are not characterized by un-
usual or excessive risks. (2) Exporting of savings generated from city neighborhoods
and older suburbs into other communities where they are invested in residential con-
struction and mortgage loans without first considering the lending needs of older
communities. (3) Relocation of associations' home offices out of the older communi-
ties and into other areas, usually into newly developing suburbs or "downtown" busi-
ness centers. (4) Withdrawal of opportunities for residents in older communities to
save at neighborhood-based savings and loan associations.
Administrative Meeting on Racial Discrimination in Lending Before the Department of
Housing and Urban Development, Hartford, Conn., May 21, 1974 (testimony of Calvin
Bradford) cited in Comment, Urban Housing Finance and The Redlining Controversy, 25
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 110, 111 n.7 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Urban Housing Finance]. The
first definition in the quote is synonymous with the definition of redlining. The latter three
definitions can also be considered part of a definition of disinvestment. The inclusion of the
relocation of financial institutions' home offices from older communities to other neighbor-
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vestment does not necessarily include redlining;8 therefore, the dis-
tinction between these terms will be retained throughout this
comment." In addition, a distinction between redlining and disin-
hoods as part of the definition of disinvestment gives coherence to the methods chosen to
enforce the Community Reinvestment Act on both the federal and state levels. See notes
32-34, 75 infra.
Depository institutions play a crucial role in maintaining the stability of neighborhoods.
The process of "pulling out" of a neighborhood raises the proverbial query of the chicken or
the egg. Do banks pull out of a neighborhood first or do landlords and homeowners who
participate in a flurry of sales, alerting banks to a perceived decline in the neighborhood?
When landlords do pull out of buildings do they cause an actual decline in property value
due to their perceived fear of a decline in property value? The process of decline is probably
a combination of all of these actions. Wisniewski, supra note 7, at 370. Redlining in the
strict sense is damaging because it is the process by which banks' predictions of decline
become self-fulfilling prophecies. Bankers' fear of decline in a neighborhood is largely the
cause of the decline. SQUEEZING Us DRY, supra note 1, at 2.
Redlining should also be distinguished from discrimination against an individual loan ap-
plicant. Again, it is the distinction which makes redlining so damaging. When institutions
redline, they reject an entire neighborhood, not just the individual applicant, thereby accel-
erating the deterioration of the neighborhood. Wisniewski, supra note 7, at 370.
8. See note 7 supra. Under the definition of redlining which will be used in this Com-
ment, a bank could decide to issue no further loans to a neighborhood based upon the need
to diversify its portfolio of mortgage loans. While the decision not to lend would be based
upon the location of the property, it would not be an arbitrary criterion in that instance.
9. This article will be based upon the assumption that both redlining and disinvestment
exist. Werner, Frej & Madway, supra note 1, at 505; Comment, Redlining: Potential Civil
Rights and Sherman Act Violations Raised by Lending Policies, 8 IND. L. REV. 1045 n.3
(1975). Urban Housing Finance, supra note 7, at 112-13 n.14.
The prestigious MIT-Harvard Joint Center surveyed all relevant studies and reports
available in late 1974 and concluded: "Red-lining-the unavailability of mortgages on
the basis of area-although no longer formally practiced, nevertheless is found to be
effectively present. A process of disinvestment by local thrift institutions is found to
be occurring in many inner-city neighborhoods. . . ." MIT- HARVARD JOINT CENTER,
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND NEIGHBORHOOD DECLINE: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 4
(1974), in S. 1281 Hearings at 618, cited in Comment, Urban Housing Finance and
the Redlining Controversy, 25 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 112-13 n.14 (1976).
Id.
Fourteen Brooklyn-based banks have been chosen for study to evaluate the effectiveness
of state and federal legislation prohibiting redlining. The results in a recent study on redlin-
ing in New York State were mixed. SCHAFER supra note 1, at 3-102. The Crown Heights,
East Flatbush and Fort Greene neighborhoods in Brooklyn are among those for which re-
sults were mixed. Allegations that the racial composition of the neighborhood was one of the
arbitrary criteria used by lenders in discriminating among mortgage applications were con-
tradicted by the results in three metropolitan areas. Yet the results were mixed in the New
York-Nassau-Suffolk and Rochester metropolitan areas. Id. at 13-5, 13-11. In these areas
equivocal results occurred because different segments of the analysis pointed to opposite
conclusions. Id. at 13-11. In another section of the study, it was found that some but not all
the neighborhoods alleged to have been redlined had higher than average default rates. In
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vestment, and what will be referred to as "discrimination in the
larger sense" or the "multiplier effect of discrimination" will be
made.' 0
addition, default rates in several areas allegedly not redlined were found to be higher than
those in areas alleged to be redlined. Id. at 3-102. However, delinquency rates and fore-
closure rates were not highly correlated. Id. at 3-103. In addition, there was consistent evi-
dence that "default risk [was] not associated with the age of the housing stock within a
neighborhood." Id. at 3-104.
(Also,] properties located in areas alleged to be redlined [did] not have statistically
significantly higher probabilities of delinquency. They also [did] not have more severe
delinquencies.
The finding that a default risk [was], in general, unrelated to whether a property
[was] located in an area alleged to be redlined reveals the danger of using simple
area-specific default rates in the investigation of lending risk. Although the analysis
of simple delinquency and foreclosure rates shows that not all areas alleged to be
redlined have higher-than-average, default rates, enough of these areas have suffi-
ciently high rates to warrant concern over the risk of lending in them. However, the
multivariate analysis of default risk suggests that many factors other than location
may be responsible for the high delinquency and foreclosure rates that are occurring
in these areas. (emphasis added) Id. at 3-105-3-106.
These conclusions can be criticized. The study relied upon the subjective perceptions of
community organizations and neighborhood residents to identify allegedly redlined neigh-
borhoods rather than objective criteria. Id. at 13-5. These perceptions are in all likelihood
biased and may further be inaccurate. Yet redlining may still objectively exist. The results
of the study, however, strongly supported the allegations that the race of an applicant is a
crucial factor in lending decisions in New York State. Id. at 13-11.
In other studies stronger conclusions with respect to the existence of redlining have been
reached.
Stuyvesant Heights is a stable, all black neighborhood with very high rates of
homeownership that has been more than 50% black since the late 1930s. [sic] It had
a perfect foreclosure record with the ten banks in the last five years, and eighty-one
sales last year, yet received only four mortgages.
In the Flatbush-East/Flatbush communities . . . the mortgage stock maps indicate
a relatively heavy concentration in the past of conventional one-to-four family mort-
gages; however, on the flow map for the same type of loans there is a large void in the
area. .. The property sales and non-white population change maps show that this
is an area of high racial and property turnover. There have been some foreclosures in
the past five years but the overwhelming majority of the more than forty census
tracts have had no foreclosures. NEw YORK STATE BANKING DEPARTMENT: MORTGAGE
REFINANCING AND HOUSING MARKETS IN NEW YORK STATE: A PRELIMINARY REPORT IV-
E-10, IV-E-12 (1977) [hereinafter cited as N.Y.S. BANKING DEP'T]
See also G. LEYLAND, DETERMINING PRIORITIES OF NEED FOR GUARANTEED MORTGAGE FUNDS
1-3 (1976).
10. The latter will be defined as discrimination in employment and/or housing, which
causes people to earn lower salaries and obtain poorer quality housing than would be ob-
tained by those against whom no discrimination has been practiced. As a result, those
against whom discrimination has been practiced live in neighborhoods which would truly be
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II. Current Legislation
A. The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975
In 1975 Congress enacted the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
("HMDA")." The Act requires depository institutions to make
public the location and amount of mortgage loans issued by depos-
itory institutions each year. Using this information, public officials
can then determine whether the depository institutions are fulfil-
ling their obligations to serve the housing needs of the neighbor-
hoods in which they are located.1"
The HMDA was adopted in response to intense lobbying efforts
by a national federation of community groups, organized to elimi-
nate redlining.' s However, the HMDA fails to achieve the ultimate
goal of these groups for two reasons. First, the HMDA imposes no
duty upon banks to refrain from redlining or disinvestment.1 4 Sec-
ond, neither the HMDA nor the regulations promulgated pursuant
to it proscribe any sanctions for noncompliance with the disclosure
requirements. 5 Congress merely intended to mandate disclosure of
loan statistics in the hope that depositors would invest their funds
in an institution which had demonstrated in the past that it has
reinvested depositors' funds in the community."' However, the
HMDA only requires that the loan statistics be made available
upon the request of interested citizens.1 7 Therefore, because this
considered bad risks by mortgage lenders. There is a "multiplier effect" when a person is
paid a lower salary then he should receive because of employment discrimination, and can
only obtain poor quality housing. This Comment is also based upon the assumption that
"discrimination in the larger sense" is practiced. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No.
88-352, 78 Stat. 255 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 (1976)) as amended by Pub. L. No. 92-
261, 86 Stat. 109 (1972); Fair Housing Act of i968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. 3601 (1976)); An Act of April 13, 1951, ch. 800, 1951 N.Y. Laws (codified at
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 1972).
11. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2809 (Supp. 1976).
12. Id. § 2801(b).
13. NYPIRG, TAKE THE MoNEY AND RuN: REDLINING IN BROOKLYN, Two YEARS LATER 2
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Two Y.ARs LATER].
14. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2809 (Supp. 1976).
15. Id. See 12 C.F.R. § 203 (1980).
16. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-561, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. Rep. No. 94-10024, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. Rep. No. 94-726, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. Rep. No. 94-
187, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. Rep. No. 94-533, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); 121 Cong.
Rec. for the following days: July 26, 1975; Sept. 4, 1975; Oct. 30, 1975; Oct. 31, 1975; Dec. 15,
1975; Dec. 18, 1975.
17. 12 C.F.R. § 203.4 (a)(2)(i)-(ii) (1980).
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information is not widely disseminated, even this hoped for deposi-
tor action is unlikely to materialize.18
B. The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977
In 1977, Congress enacted the Community Reinvestment Act
("CRA"). 9 The purpose of the CRA is to "encourage [financial]
institutions to help meet the credit needs of the local communities
in which they are chartered consistent with the safe and sound op-
eration of such institutions." 20 These institutions "are required by
law to demonstrate that their deposit facilities serve the conve-
nience and needs of the communities in which they are chartered
to do business" and they have a "continuing and affirmative obli-
gation to help meet [such] needs."2 In short, the CRA reaffirms
the traditional role of the mutual savings banks as well as requir-
ing other depository institutions to help meet the investment
needs of their communities. 2 In addition, the CRA requires these
institutions to meet the credit needs of the entire community, in-
cluding low- and moderate-income neighborhoods.2
The language used in the CRA is unclear. The CRA does not
specifically prohibit redlining, because it does not prohibit a bank's
arbitrary refusal of a prudent mortgage loan on the basis of the
location of the property for which the loan is to be issued.24 In-
stead the language of the CRA mandates reinvestment.2 5 Congress'
intent in enacting the CRA supports this interpretation., This lat-
18. Only community groups, legislators and analysts rather than the general public have
taken advantage of this availability. SQUEEZING Us DRY, supra note 1. TAKE THE MONEY
AND RUN, supra note 2. SCHAFER, supra note 1. See S. HIRSCH, MORTGAGE LENDING PRAC-
TICES OF SAVINGS BANKS IN NEW YORK STATE (1979) [hereinafter cited as HIRSCH].
19. 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (Supp. 11 1978).
20. Id. § 2901.
21. Id.
22. See note 176 infra.
23. 12 U.S.C. § 2903(1) (Supp. 1969-1979).
24. See note 1 supra. A statute prohibiting redlining could use language of proscription
and define redlining as discrimination, based upon the location of property being used as
security for a loan.
25. See notes 20, 21, 23 supra. Under the CRA, the banks have an obligation to serve
their communities credit needs. 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (Supp. 1969-1979). This is language of
prescription rather than of proscription.
26. See Cong. Rep. No. H.R. 6655, reprinted in Cong. Rec. H10097 (daily ed. Sept. 26,
1977); Cong. Rec. H10564 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1977); Cong. Rec. S16112 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1977).
The legislative history indicates that Congress only intended the CRA to embody a nation-
[Vol. IX
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ter interpretation of the CRA is the more radical one. Rather than
just prohibiting discrimination, the CRA imposes upon the private
sector an obligation to society.'7
While the CRA, like the HMDA, contains 4o specific means of
enforcement,"8 regulations promulgated pursuant to the CRA do
include enforcement provisions.2 Under these regulations, a bank-
ing institution must survey the neighborhood surrounding its home
wide policy of community reinvestment.
27. The private business sector's moral obligations to the public have been the subjects
of controversy in the past. See Peck v. Greyhound Corp., 97 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
In Peck, it was held that a recommendation by shareholders that the management of Grey-
hound should consider abolition of the segregated seating system on buses in the south was
not a proper subject for shareholder action. Id. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(2) (1952) (re-
pealed 1979). Under this rule a proposal was not a proper subject for shareholder action
"[i]f it clearly appears that the proposal is submitted by the security holder . . . primarily
for the purpose of promoting general economic, political, racial, religious, social or similar
causes." Id.
Depository institutions have argued that being forced to invest in their local communities,
subjects their depositors' funds to greater risk, because their portfolios will no longer be
diversified. CUTLER, History, Character and Recent Difficulties of Mutual Savings Banks,
PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD MUTUAL SAVINGS BANKS IN NEW YORK STATE: PROPOSALS FOR
CHANGE 33, 106 (L. Lapidus ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as CUTLER]. One commentator has
argued that if Congress intended to mandate reinvestment, this policy may be unconstitu-
tional. Givens, The "Antiredlining" Issue: Can Banks Be Forced to Lend?, 95 BANKING L.J.
515, 520-525 (1978). If the "safe and sound" investment language of the CRA is not read to
require reinvestment only where the return and risk are as good as otherwise obtainable, the
CRA may be unconstitutional for three reasons. First, the reinvestment provisions may con-
stitute an uncompensated taking thereby violating both state and federal due process
clauses. Id. at 521. If "sound operation" means obtaining the best return on investment, it
may also be relevant to state or local reinvestment requirements that go beyond barring
redlining in the narrow sense. Alternatively, "sound operations'.' may merely require local
investment where equally favorable from the viewpoint of risk and return. Id. Second, the
reinvestment requirement may also violate the commerce clause as local regulation which
favors local economic interests at the expense of the free flow of commerce. Id. See Philadel-
phia v. New Jersey, .437 U.S. 617 (1978); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794
(1976). In addition, the CRA, when applied to nationally chartered institutions may further
conflict with the commerce clause, in that "Congress' intent was that these institutions ful-
fill a national function in making credit and investment available on a national scale as part
of a countrywide interlocking system." Givens, supra, at 524. At the same time, if the rein-
vestment provisions of the CRA were held inapplicable to federally chartered institutions,
state chartered institutions would be at a competitive disadvantage. Id. at 525.
Finally, the CRA reinvestment requirements may violate the contract clause of the federal
Constitution. When depositors and stockholders invest in an institution, there is an implied
contract that those funds be deposited or invested in a prudent manner. Forced reinvest-
ment may impair the ability of banks to meet this obligation. Id. at 523.
28. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2809 (Supp. 1976); 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2905 (Supp. 11 1978).
29. 12 C.F.R. § 345 (1980).
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office and branches and draft a statement, known as the Commu-
nity Reinvestment Act Statement ("CRAS") which describes the
physical boundaries of the area the bank will serve and identifies
the credit services and terms it is prepared to offer in this area.30
The appropriate federal financial supervisory agency, normally the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board in the case of mutual savings
banks, is required to assess the institution's record of meeting the
local credit needs of Its "entire community." 3' 1 The agency must
then use this information to determine whether to grant an institu-
tion's application for a charter, for participation in deposit insur-
ance, for a new branch or a relocation, merger, consolidation, or
acquisition of shares in a bank holding company.2 If the agency
determines that the bank has not met the credit needs of its com-
munity, it must deny the application.
In addition to the problems created by the ambiguities in the
language of the CRA, other problems are created by the means of
enforcement. The appropriate agency can only review a bank's
community reinvestment performance when a bank applies for a
charter, for permission to open a new branch or to merge with an-
other bank, or for permission to engage in similar activities. This
means of enforcement can be used often, because banks continu-
ally branch or merge with other banks to survive. However, these
agencies have no other means of compelling banks to change their
investment behavior., In addition, an individual applicant for a
mortgage loan who thinks he has been refused a loan because of
redlining has no civil redress.8'
Banks often evade the purpose of the CRA. Banks define the
local communities which they serve either so narrowly that they
serve only those communities which they wish to serve, 5 or so
broadly that it is difficult to attribute reinvestment to any particu-
30. Id. § 345.4.
31. Id. § 345.7.
32. Id. § 345.8.
33. See 12 C.F.R. § 345 (1980).
34. Id. Allowing an individual redress is only necessary if the CRA was intended, at least
in part, to prevent redlining.
35. The New York State Banking Department has sometimes asked a bank to redefine
its local community in its CRA statement to include a larger area, before the Department
would approve an application for a new branch, or for a merger, etc. Interview with a mem-
ber of the New York State Banking Department (Sept. 12, 1980). See note 75 infra.
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lar community or neighborhood. 86 In addition, while federal regula-
tory agencies appear to have used the regulations promulgated
under the CRA as effectively as is possible, 7 changes in banks'
lending patterns have been slow. It is clear that while banks have
reversed their patterns of mortgage investment as a whole, they
have not changed their lending patterns substantially in neighbor-
36. For example, in its CRA statement, the Dime Savings Bank of New York defines its
local community for the purposes of the CRA, as approximately the center third of Manhat-
tan and all of Brooklyn, Staten Island, Nassau and Suffolk counties and part of Queens.
Community Reinvestment Act Statement, The Dime Savings Bank of New York (Feb. 2,
1979).
37. In April 1979, the Federal Depositors Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was the first
agency to reject an application because a bank had failed to meet the reinvestment require-
ments of the CRA. Two YuAns LATER, supra, note 13, at 5. Federal agencies have not re-
fused any other applications in New York for noncompliance with the CRA. The FDIC re-
cently rejected a second application in New Jersey, and has denied other applications in
other regions. The FDIC does not have records of the number of applications received and
their disposition. Interview with Cynthia Lewis, Regional Advisor for Community Affairs,
FDIC, in New York City (Oct. 2, 1980). However, regulatory agencies and community
groups often negotiate compromises with banks whose applications they have challenged.
Once a compromise is reached, the bank's application is approved. See note 75 infra.
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hoods which have been alleged to be redlined.3 5 The more subtle
change has been in the attitudes of both the banks and the agen-
cies regulating them.3 '
38.
1977 * 1978** 1979 *
Redlined* Non-Redlined Redlined Non-Redlined Redlined Non-Redlined
Dime of New York 1109 31,209 1341 33,110 3150 51,699
Lincoln - - 1366 8730 540 8236
Greater New York 492 1093 1873 6816 5059 24,443
Williamsburgh - - 2255 9040 1712 4934
Brooklyn 690 2062 2542 6429 3498 6897
Anchor 38 1737 334 15,472 102 6483
Metropolitan 2013 8289 - - 387 12,926
Greenpoint - - 267 18,227 80 10,467
Independence 2976 3519 3451 3274 6375 6777
Franklin Savings 72 253 0 987 28 8118
East New York 502 1910 0 111 116 995
Hamburg 503 2534 53 1845 0 364
Roosevelt 46 709 45 2403 72 4710
Dime of Williamsburgh 722 991 44 2124 168 564
Dollar amounts are in thousands
*For the purposes of this study the following neighborhoods are considered to be redlined: Boerum Hill, Brooklyn Heights,
Carroll Garden Clinton Hills, Cobble Hill, Downtown Broolyn, Fort Greene, Gowanus, Crown Heights, East Flatbush, Park
Slope. See Schafter, supra note 1 at vi. The statistics from each census tract were aggregated into neighborhoods. The
boundary lines of the neighborhoods are both historical and subjective views of where these neighborhoods are. COOPERA-
TIVE COMMUNITY PLANNING, NEw YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, Neighorhood Profiles (Aug. 1978).
**See Supervisory Procedure G-107, supra note 4, at Appendix 9, 1977, 1978.
***The source of this information is a New York State Banking Department print-out of statistics from the real estate
register of each borough, aggregated into neighborhoods, for 1979.
tAll of the banks, except the Franklin Savings Bank, are considered to be based in Brooklyn by the New York State
Banking Department. The Franklin Savings Bank was also included because, while it is Manhattan-based, over a third of
its deposits are from Brooklyn neighborhoods. Two Years Later, supra note 13 at 11.
While the number and dollar amount of loans to redlined neighborhoods increased three-fold from 1977 to 1979, two-
thirds of the total was in Park Slope, a former Italian neighborhood which is now being flooded with young professionals
from Manhattan, and Brooklyn Heights, a neighborhood included by community groups as part of central Brooklyn, which
traditionally has been an upper middle-class white neighborhood. The figures for Metropolitan and Fulton Savings Banks
are combined for 1977 and 1978. Fulton Savings Bank merged into Metropolitan Savings Bank, therefore, 1979 figures are
for Metropolitan only.
39. The FDIC's rejection of a New Jersey bank's application was the first application
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C. New York's Equivalent "HMDA" Regulations
A state-chartered depository institution is exempted from the re-
quirements of the HMDA, if the Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System determines that under state law, the institu-
tion is subject to requirements similar to those of the HMDA.40
The New York State Banking Department promulgated Supervi-
sory Procedure G-107 which exempts state-chartered banks from
the federal reporting requirements."
In Appendix 9, under the G-107 regulations, a bank must report
the number and dollar amount of mortgage loans by census tract
or ZIP code.42 Banks must make this information available to the
public under a format prescribed by the regulation and must sub-
mit this information to the Banking Department no later than
August of the year following the calendar year to be reported.48
In Appendix 7 which is entitled the "Equal Housing Opportu-
nity Lender Form," a banking organization must record all loan
applications, the reasons for granting or denying each application,
and the terms of those approved. 45 A bank must also answer ques-
tions about the loan applicant's creditworthiness, and about his
race and marital status.4" This informaton is not disclosed to the
public. It is for the use of the Banking Department only, and its
which was not challenged by a community group. For the first time, members of the FDIC
placed the onus of enforcing the law upon themselves, not upon community groups. Inter-
view with Cynthia Lewis, Regional Advisor for Community Affairs, FDIC, in New York City
(Oct. 2, 1980). Just scheduling a proceeding to hear testimony about a bank's record has a
psychological impact on banks. Community groups have stated that banks would not talk to
them until a proceeding was scheduled. Id.; Two YEARS LATER, supra note 13, at 4. The
FDIC has been able to facilitate negotiations between banks and community groups and
establish communications where previously there were none. Prior to the CRA, the FDIC
and other regulatory agencies condoned the practice of taking money out of bad areas for
the sake of safety. Now, some bankers see the eventual possibility of making money. One
also cannot emphasize just mortgage loans. For example, one must also look at banks'
records of investment in participation loans, in rehabilitation, and section eight housing,
when guaging the changes in the community. Interview with Cynthia Lewis, Regional Advi-
sor for Community Affairs, FDIC, in New York City (Oct. 2, 1980).
40. 12 U.S.C. § 2805(b) (Supp. 1976).
41. See Supervisory Procedure G-107, supra note 4; Regulation C, 12 C.F.R. Part 203
(1980).
42. Supervisory Procedure G-107, supra note 4, § 107.2(b)(1),(2).
43. Id. g 107.2(a).
44. Id., Appendix 7 at 5.
45. Id., § 107.7, Appendix 7, Part III, at 8.
46. Id., Appendix 7 at 5, Part I.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
purpose is to "insure that discrimination in housing mortgage
credit does not occur.""
The M2 record in Appendix 8 of the G-107 format, requires
banking organizations to keep records of the number and dollar
amount of mortgaged properties in each census tract or ZIP code
which currently are being foreclosed. Records must also be kept of
those properties which have been foreclosed in the last fiscal year
and of those which have been foreclosed in the last five fiscal
years.4" Banks must also keep records of the number and dollar
amount of delinquent payments on mortgaged properties, "" and of
the number and dollar amount of distressed properties for which
loans have been renegotiated prior to maturity, sold at a loss or
written off, in the last five fiscal years.50 Finally, records of the av-
erage terms of the loans granted in the last fiscal year must be
kept. The terms required are the average ratios of the original loan
amount to the original appraisal amount, the average rate of inter-
est on loans granted, and the average maturity of loans granted in
the last fiscal year.5 1 This information must be made available to
the public.52
Prior to the enactment of the HMDA and the G-107 Supervisory
Procedure, information on the number and dollar amount of loans
and their location could only be obtained with a substantial
amount of time and effort.58 Now this information is readily avail-
47. Id., Appendix 7 at 5. See Supervisory Procedure G-107, supra note 4, §§ 107.6,
107.7, 107.8.
48. Id., Appendix 8, (e), M2 at 3(b)(1)-(2), (f)(1)-(2), (g)(1)-(2), 4(b)(1)-(2), (f)(1)-(2),(g)(1)-(2), 5(b)(1)-(2), (f)(1)-(2), (g)(1)-(2), 6(b)(1)-(2), (f)(1)(2), (g)(1)-(2), 7(b)(1)-(2), (f)(1)-
(2), (g)(1)-(2), 8(b)(1)-(2), (f)(1)-(2), (g)(1)-(2).
49. Id., Appendix 8, (e), M2 at 3(c)(1)-(2), 4(c)(1)-(2), 5(c)(1)-(2), 6(c)(1)-(2), 7(c)(1)-(2),
8(c)(1)-(2).
50. Id., Appendix 8, (e), M2 at 3(h)(1)-(2), 4(h)(1)-(2), 5(h)(1)-(2), 6(h)(1)-(2), 7(h)(1)-
(2), 8(h)(1)-(2).
51. Id., Appendix 8, (e), M2 at 3(i)(3)-(5), 4(i)(3)-(5), 5(i)(3)-(5), 6(i)(3)-(5), 7(i)(3)-(5),
8(i)(3)-(5).
52. Id. § 107.6.
53. Before the HMDA and the G-107 Supervisory Procedure were enacted, community
groups examined local real estate registers to determine in what neighborhoods banks had
issued mortgage loans and to determine the types of loan issued. From the registers they
could also determine demand, by counting the number of loans financed by the seller him-
self (a purchase money mortgage) or by other private lending institutions. However, ob-
taining this information was a time consuming job for groups which were understaffed and
underpaid, if paid at all. Two YEARs LATER, supra note 13, at 2-3.
[Vol. IX100
REDLINING
able to the public in a format which is easy to understand.
However, there are three criticisms of the present G-107 format.
First, while the number and dollar amount of mortgage loans can
be obtained from a real estate register either the same day or a few
days after the loan is closed,5' under Supervisory Procedure G-107,
this information cannot be obtained month by month, but rather
by the entire year and only nine months after the end of the year.55
Second, under the present G-107 format, the Banking Department
does not require banks to divide the data on the number and dol-
lar amount of mortgage loans issued for multi-family dwellings into
initial or first mortgages on the building, and mortgage loans refi-
nancing the building.56 Refinancing of loans to multi-family dwell-
ings is as crucial to the economic stability of a neighborhood as an
initial mortgage loan.57 However, this aspect of the mortgage mar-
ket is hidden. Refinancing is often ignored in studies, because
loans refinancing apartment buildings are not recorded since no
property transaction takes place. Further, under the present proce-
dure, loans to apartment buildings are not divided into these two
categories. 58 Third, the Banking Department presently does not
make Appendix 7 public." The information in this appendix could
contain proof of two types of discrimination. First, it could be used
to prove discrimination against an individual applicant. 0 Second,
in combination with Appendix 8, it could be used to prove the ex-
istence of redlining." To prove redlining, information from both
54. Interview with Office Associate of the Brooklyn City Register, in New York City
(Sept. 12, 1980). Title companies report property transactions either every day or every few
days. The City Register is required by law to record the transaction on the day it receives
notice of the transaction. Id.
55. Supervisory Procedure G-107, supra note 4, § 107.2(b)(1),(2).
56. Id. at Appendices 8-10.
57. See Two YEARS LATER, supra note 13, at 8-9.
58. SCHAFER, supra note 1, at 3-82-3-83.
59. Supervisory Procedure G-107, supra note 4, Appendix 7 at 5. See Supervisory Pro-
cedure G-107, supra note 4, at §§ 107.6, 107.7, 107.8.
60. See notes 45, 46 supra and accompanying text. It is unlikely that a loan officer would
explicitly state that he denied a loan or granted one with modified terms for discriminatory
reasons; however, if an applicant is creditworthy, even an evasive or vague statement of
reasons for the denial or modification may provide circumstantial evidence of dis-
crimination.
61. See notes 48-50 supra and accompanying text. Ironically, the information in Appen-
dix 8 in and of itself could contain strong circumstantial evidence of geographic discrimina-
tion, yet community groups do not use it in their studies. See Two YEARS LATER, supra note
1980]
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appendices would be necessary. First, one would have to show that
the rate of foreclosure and delinquent payments are no higher in
the neighborhood for which the loan is sought than in neighbor-
hoods where the creditor regularly grants loans, and second, that
the loan applicant is creditworthy. Other information in Appendix
7 could also be helpful in proving redlining. Appendix 7, as op-
posed to Appendix 8, contains information on the modification of
terms of specific loans and on the loan-to-appraised value ratio of
particular properties rather than an average of terms for all loans
within a ZIP code or census tract. 2
D. Chapter 788 of the New York State Banking Law
In December 1978, the New York state legislature enacted chap-
ter 788 of the New York Banking Law,68 which prohibits geo-
graphic discrimination in mortgage lending. Pursuant to chapter
788, no banking institution may refuse to make a prudent mort-
gage loan "or otherwise discriminate with respect thereto," because
of the geographic location of property "if such property is located
within the geographic area ordinarily serviced by such bank or
within the community within which the principal or any branch
office of such bank is located."" A prudent loan means "a loan
upon the security of real property which is prudent by acceptable
banking standards and is in compliance with all of the provisions
of this chapter, regulations of the banking board and rules of the
superintendent.""
In contrast to the CRA, the language of chapter 788 prohibits
rather than mandates certain behavior by a bank.6 More impor-
tantly, chapter 788 explicitly prohibits discrimination."' Chapter
788 could be interpreted as preventing disinvestment as well; if a
13, at 11; SQUEEZING Us DRY, supra note 1, at 6.
62. Compare Supervisory Procedure G-107, supra note 4, Appendix 8, (e), M2, 3(i)(3)-
(5), 4(i)(3)-(5), 5(i)(3)-(5), 6(i)(3)-(5), 7(i)(3)-(5), 8(i)(3)-(5) with Appendix 7, Part III, Dis-
position of Mortgage Loan Applications at 8.
63. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 9-f (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980).
64. Id. § 9-f(1).
65. Id. § 9-f(3).
66. See notes 20, 21 and 66 supra. Each bank has a continuing and affirmative obligation
to meet the credit needs of their local communities under the CRA. Under chapter 788, no
bank may refuse a prudent loan or otherwise discriminate with respect to such a loan. N.Y.
BANKING LAW § 9-f(1) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980).
67. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 9-f(l) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980).
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bank decides to make no further loans in an area in order to diver-
sify its portfolio, it would make the decision based upon the loca-
tion of the property. 8 However, because the word "discrimination"
is used in the statute and is coupled with language proscribing dis-
crimination rather than mandating investment, the intent of chap-
ter 788 to prohibit redlining is clear.
The term "prudent loan," however, as defined under chapter 788
is as ambigious as the term "safe and sound operation" under the
CRA. 9 It is unclear in both the CRA and chapter 788 whether a
prudent or safe loan is one which involves no risk or a slight risk,
or whether such a loan must be the most profitable loan which the
bank can make at that time.7 0
The state legislature included a practicable means of enforce-
ment in chapter 788. A person refused a mortgage loan can request
that the superintendent of banks review the denial. The superin-
tendent can require a lender who has allegedly violated chapter
788 to appear before him with an explanation of the denial, and
can order the lender to discontinue the practice. The superinten-
dent may also, after notice and a hearing, require the lender to pay
a fine for each violation.7 1 However, an individual has no civil rem-
edy under chapter 788.2
E. New York's Equivalent "CRA" Regulations
The state banking department has also adopted regulations
which incorporate the federal CRA regulations into its state guide-
lines for evaluating a bank's application for a new branch, for
merger with another institution, or for similar activities.7 8 In addi-
tion, chapter 788 requires banking institutions to submit CRA re-
ports to the superintendent of the New York State Banking De-
68. CUTLER, supra note 28, at 106; see notes 7 and 8 supra and accompanying text.
69. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 9-f(3) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980); 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (Supp.
1969-1979).
70. GIVENS, supra note 29, at 520-21.
71. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 39, 44 (McKinney 1971). These are general remedies under
which the superintendent of banks has the power to bring suit against a bank for violation
of any section of the banking law. See generally N.Y. BANKING LAW § 2 (McKinney 1971).
72. See id. §§ 2, 39, 44.
73. General Regulations of the Banking Board §§ 76.1-3, promulgated pursuant to N.Y.
BANKING LAW §§ 10, 601-b (McKinney 1971), 14(1), 28-b, 29 (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980)
(hereinafter cited as Regulation 76). These regulations became effective on April 23, 1979.
SAVINGS ASSOCIATION NEWS, March 1979, at 1.
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partment as well as to the federal agencies monitoring their
compliance with the Act.74
Enforcement of state regulations, like that of federal regulations,
has not yet caused increases in banks' mortgage portfolios in red-
lined areas. The New York State Banking Department, like the
FDIC, has rejected only one bank's application for non-compliance
with the CRA, and has decided in favor of many others, but often
with some accommodation by the banks.75 Although there has been
an increase in the number of loans issued in Brooklyn 76 in the face
of tremendous disintermediation in 1978 and 1979,77 the lending
patterns of the banks with respect to redlined neighborhoods have
not substantially changed. 70 Although demand has been shown,79
and although it has been demonstrated that there is only a slight
increase in risk when making loans to these areas, the majority of
mutuals studied, do not issue many mortgage loans to the neigh-
74. Ch. 788, 1978 N.Y. LAWS; N.Y. BANKING LAW § 28-b(1) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980).
75. Sixty-two applications have been accepted by the New York State Banking Depart-
ment after an initial review, without challenges from any community groups. The Banking
Department has rejected only one bank's application. However, there have been 11 chal-
lenges by community groups which were either withdrawn by these groups, after a review of
the data, or after a settlement was negotiated with the bank. There have been nine bank
applications which were accepted in the face of challenges by community groups. Several of
these decisions, including those in favor of the Dime Savings Bank of New York and Anchor
Savings Banks, were conditional approvals. For example, the Banking Department asked
the Seaman's Savings Bank to pledge that it would reinvest all the deposits from its new
branch in the community. The Banking Department has asked other banks to redefine the
community which it serves or, in the case of the Dime Savings Bank of New York, the
Banking Department monitored the bank's lending practices for several months. Three
banks whose applications have been challenged by community groups, have not been re-
solved as of July, 14, 1980.
The Banking Department itself, challenged eight applications which it eventually ap-
proved, but with some accommodations by the banks. In three other instances, applications
challenged by the Banking Department were not resolved or the challenges were withdrawn
by the Department. Interview with a member of the New York State Banking Department,
in New York City (Sept. 12, 1980).
76. See note 39 supra.
77. See note 167 infra and accompanying text.
78. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
79. See note 80 infra.
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borhoods which community groups cite as being redlined. 80
F. The Human Rights Law of New York State
The New York State Human Rights Law ("HRL") prohibits
discrimination against a person applying for credit on the basis of
race, creed, color, national origin, age, sex, marital status,
childbearing potential, or disability.81 The HRL also prohibits dis-
crimination against a class of borrowers on the basis of their creed,
DamAND FOR LOANS Vwwus LOAN InSUu By EACH
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81. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296-a (McKinney 1972). (Sections 296-a, 297, 297-a will be cited
hereinafter as N.Y. HUMAN RiGHTS LAW § 296 in the text.)
Doar mot orm in tboonds
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color, national origin, age, sex, marital status, childbearing poten-
tial or disability.82 While the HRL does not prohibit redlining, it
will be discussed as a prototype upon which future legislation
prohibiting redlining should be based.
Under the HRL an aggrieved party has two possible administra-
tive remedies. The party may file a complaint with the Human
Rights Division of New York or with the New York State Banking
Department.8" If a complaint is filed with the human rights divi-
sion and the division finds that there is probable cause to believe
that the allegation is true, it may attempt to eliminate the unlaw-
ful discriminatory practice by conference, conciliation and persua-
sion. 4 If the complainant objects to the agreement reached as part
of this conference, the division must schedule a public hearing
before a hearing examiner.85 The hearing examiner, at his discre-
tion may allow intervention by any party with a substantial per-
sonal interest and may join necessary parties." The examiner also
may enter a default judgment if a bank fails to answer the com-
plaint." If the hearing officer finds that the bank engaged in a dis-
criminatory practice, the hearing officer may issue: (1) an order re-
quiring the bank to cease and desist from the practice; (2) an order
requiring the bank to take affirmative action to effect the purposes
of the law, or (3) the hearing officer may require the bank to pay
the aggrieved party compensatory damages, and/or require the
bank to turn over to the state any profits obtained through the
unlawful discriminatory practice.88
If, after such an order, the commissioner of human rights deter-
82. Id. § 296-a(1)(a). Under a similar federal regulation, creditors are prohibited from
discriminating against an applicant, regarding any aspect of the credit transaction on the
basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, or age (provided that the
applicant has the capacity to enter into a binding contract) or due to the fact that all or part
of the applicant's income derives from any public assistance program, or the fact that the
applicant has in good faith exercised any right under the Consumer Credit Protection Act or
any State law upon which an exemption has been granted by the Board. 12 C.F.R. § 202.4,
202.2(2) (1980).
83. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 9-d (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296-a
(McKinney Supp. 1972-1979).
84. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 297(3)(a) (McKinney 1972).
85. Id. §§ 297(2)(b),(4)(a).
86. Id. 8 297(4)(a).
87. Id. 8 297(4)(b).
88. Id. § 297(4)(c).
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mines that the bank is acting in a manner which renders the order
ineffectual, the commissioner may apply to a state supreme court
for an order to show cause why the bank should not be enjoined
from such action. 89 However, within a year after the conciliation
agreement or order, the commissioner of human rights must take
action to assure compliance with his order, if he finds upon investi-
gation that the bank has not complied with the agreement or
order.90
An aggrieved person's alternative administrative remedy is to
lodge a complaint with the superintendent of the banking depart-
ment."1 The superintendent, like the commissioner of human
rights, may attempt to resolve the complaint by conference and
conciliation, if there is probable cause to believe that redlining is
being practiced.'2 If the complaint is not resolved in this manner, a
hearing must be conducted.98 One fault of section 296-a is that the
hearing examiner need not be someone detached from any attempt
at conference or conciliation of the complaint. The objectivity of
one connected with prior negotiations is questionable.,
Unlike the commissioner, neither the superintendent nor his
representative are empowered to enter an order in default." How-
ever, an aggrieved party may obtain judicial review of the superin-
tendent's order, just as he may obtain review of an order by the
commissioner of human rights. Finally, an aggrieved party has a
cause of action in state supreme court if he has not already filed a
complaint with the division of human rights or with the banking
department.'5 His right to file a complaint in court is not
prejudiced if he previously filed a complaint with the division of
human rights which was dismissed.9
A major criticism of hearings before both the human rights divi-
sion and the banking department is that most mortgagors must
89. Id. § 297(6).
90. Id. § 297(7).
91. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 9-d (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980); N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296-a
(McKinney Supp. 1972-1979).
92. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296-a(7)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1972-1979).
93. Id. § 296-a(7)(b). The Superintendent may also issue orders similiar to those under
section 297 of the HRL. Id. at § 296-a(7)(c)(1)-(4).
94. See N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296-a (McKinney Supp. 1972-1979).
95. Id. §§ 296-a(f)(d), 297(a).
96. Id.
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find a means of finance quickly and therefore have little incentive
to file a grievance against the creditor, once substitute financing is
arranged. 7 Shortening the time allowed the banking department
or the human rights division between the filing of a complaint and
its resolution is one solution. However, there are better solutions.
At present in a hearing before the human rights division, the hear-
ing examiner may, at his discretion, permit a person with a sub-
stantial interest to intervene.98 The right to intervene should be
expanded to allow intervention by a party with a substantial inter-
est such as a public interest organization. In the alternative, such
an organization should be allowed to initially bring suit on the
mortgagor's behalf. It would be better to allow an organization to
file the complaint initially, because it may be able to choose a good
test case and assume the expense of preparation for the hearing.
Also, enabling such an organization to file a complaint initially
would strengthen the chances that the case would continue rather
than be dropped once the mortgagor obtains credit.
A second criticism of hearings before the human rights division
and the banking department is that in both, the burden of proof is
not defined by statute and it is ill-defined by case law.99 Unless
Appendix seven is made public, the complainant will not have ac-
cess to the facts necessary to prove discrimination against him,
based upon personal characteristics, or based upon the location of
the property to be security for the loan.100 Therefore, the burden of
97. See SCHAFER, supra note 1, at 13-45.
98. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 297(4)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
99. Under sections 296-a and 297 the hearing examiner is not bound by the strict rules
of evidence. However, these sections do not mention any procedural standards. N.Y. ExEc.
LAW §§ 296-a(7)(b), 297(4)(a). While there are no cases adjudicating the burden of proof
under section 296, under section 297, courts defining the burden of proof have reached dif-
fering results. In Palmer v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 63 A.D.2d 1053, 405
N.Y.S.2d 814 (3d Dep't 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 47 N.Y.2d 734, 390 N.E.2d 1174, 417
N.Y.S.2d 250 (1979), the complainant carried the burden of proving by substantial evidence,
the truth of his allegations of unlawful discrimination. In New York Inst. of Technology v.
State Div. of Human Rights, 48 A.D.2d 132, 368 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1st Dep't), rev'd on other
grounds, 40 N.Y.2d 316, 353 N.E.2d 598, 386 N.Y.S.2d 685 (1975), the burden of proof
shifted to the respondent employer, after a prima facie showing of a discriminatory employ-
ment practice had been made. In Board of Ed. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 42 A.D.2d 49,
345 N.Y.S.2d 93 (2d Dep't), afl'd, 35 N.Y.2d 673, 319 N.E.2d 202, 360 N.Y.S.2d 887 (1973),
the burden of proof lay with the respondent employer named in the complaint to prove he
had not given exceptional treatment to an employee on the basis of gender.
100. See notes 46-49 supra.
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proof should be shifted to the creditor, the party with knowledge
of these facts.0 1
In addition to the criticisms of both remedies, a major distinc-
tion between the hearing before the human rights commissioner
and the hearing before the superintendent of banks may make the
former the preferred remedy. In view of the fact that the superin-
tendent of banks or his representative hears only cases dealing
with discriminatory practices by creditors, 102 such a representative
may develop an expertise greater than that of a hearing examiner
presiding over cases involving all types of discriminatory practices
proscribed under the Human Rights Law. The banking depart-
ment representative's caseload may be lighter as well for this rea-
son. However, because the representative is from the banking de-
partment it would be difficult for such a representative to maintain
political neutrality. The banking department, particularly in light
of the CRA, the law preventing geographic discrimination, and the
Human Rights Law, must balance two roles, that of a watchdog
whose job it is to prevent discrimination, with its traditional role
as bank examiner, protecting depositors and other bank customers
by assuring the financial soundness of state-chartered banks.103
Like any regulatory agency, it must maintain the respect of those
it regulates and yet enforce the laws. While an examiner from the
banking department may have expertise as to banking practices,
an examiner of the human right division may have developed an
expertise about discrimination in general and moreover, may be
able to maintain greater objectivity.
G. The State of New York Mortgage Agency
In 1970 the legislature created the State of New York Mortgage
Agency ("SONYMA"). 04 The purpose of the agency is to .provide
greater stability to the construction industry by making residential
mortgages a more attractive investment for the private banking
system.' 05 By attracting more investments, the volatility of the
101. See notes 61-64 supra.
102. See N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296-a (McKinney Supp. 1979).
103. N.Y. BANKING LAW §§ 9-f, 36 (McKinney 1971); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 296, 296-a, 297,
297-a (McKinney Supp. 1979).
104. State of New York Mortgage Agency Act, chs. 612-614, 1970 N.Y. LAWS (codified at
N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW §§ 2401-2429-f (McKinney Supp. 1970-79)).
105. N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 2401 (McKinney Supp. 1970-1979).
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supply of mortgage funds over the business cycle is supposed to be
reduced. 6 The legislature deemed SONYMA necessary to remedy
the "seriously inadequate supply of safe and sanitary dwelling ac-
comodations, including accomodations for persons and families of
low income. 10 7 The legislature also found that there has been a
recurrent cyclical shortage of residential mortgage funds in private
banking which has contributed "to the persistence of slums and
blight and to the deterioration of the quality of the environment
and living conditions of New York State residents."10 8 Because of
this shortage people were unable to either buy or sell homes, and
legislators feared that the shortage might result in a crisis in refi-
nancing many of the sound, older multiple dwellings.109
SONYMA periodically creates a secondary mortgage market by
purchasing mortgages from state banks whenever there is an inad-
equate supply of credit available for residential mortgage loans.110
The banks in turn, must invest an amount equal to the proceeds
they receive from the sale of the mortgages in residential real prop-
erty, within the state."' SONYMA at its discretion prescribes the
terms of the new mortgages which the banks must purchase.1 ' The
terms prescribed include: (1) the loan-to-appraised value ratio, (2)
the length of maturity, (3) the interest rate, and (4) the types of
dwelling, such as one-to-two family dwellings, or in the most recent
offering, one-to-four family dwellings.113 In addition, thirty percent
of these new commitments have to be made on property meeting
106. Id. § 2401. In the statute's legislative findings it is stated that the "seriously inade-
quate supply of safe and sanitary dwellings and accommodations, including accommodations
for persons and families of low income . . . is contrary to the public interest and threatens
the health, safety, welfare, comfort and security of the people of the state." Id. For an excel-
lent discussion of the constitutionality of such government mortgage agencies, whose only
purpose is to increase the housing supply, see 84 HARv. L. REV. 1921 (1971); cf. 49 N.C. L.
REV. 830, 836 (1970-1971) (where the Housing Corporation's goal is to eliminate the
shortage of low cost housing, the Corporation's activities are achieving a public purpose
although the corporation does so indirectly by engaging in private business).
107. Governor's Memoranda, Nelson A. Rockefeller, 1970 N.Y. LAWS 3111 (McKinney's).
108. N.Y. PuB. AUTH. LAW § 2401 (McKinney Supp. 1970-1979).
109. Governor's Memoranda, Nelson A. Rockefeller, 1970 N.Y. LAWS 3111 (McKinney's).
110. Id. § 2405(1),(10) (McKinney Supp. 1970-1979).
111. Id. § 2405(1).
112. Id. §2405(3).
113. See, e.g., State of New York Mortgage Agency, Invitation for Offers Relating to
120,000,000 Series 1, Home Mortgage Revenue Bonds, Sept. 15, 1978 at C.
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one of several criteria which are prescribed by the agency.114 Until
recently, the requirement that the property be in a low-income or
redlined neighborhood has never been included among the addi-
tional criteria.1 5
SONYMA cannot approve commitments or actual loans on
multi-family dwellings unless the borrower is a corporation and
prior written approval from SONYMA has been obtained." 6
SONYMA may not approve such a commitment if it would in-
crease the dollar amount of mortgages for multi-family dwellings
approved by the agency in excess of forty percent of the total
purchase price of all mortgages previously purchased by
SONYMA. 117
The dollar amount of bonds issued by SONYMA from 1971 to
1979 is small even when compared only to the demand for mort-
gage loans issued by private financial institutions in Brooklyn in
1979.1'8
114. Id. at C(1).
115. See note 122 infra.
116. N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 2405(3) (McKinney Supp. 1979). In its latest offering, be-
cause of the Ullman-Connable Bill pending in Congress, SONYMA had to require, for the
first time that seventy of the bank's new commitments be made to low and moderate income
neighborhoods. These new commitments had to be made in census tracts where seventy
percent or more of the families have income which is eighty percent or less than the New
York median family income. This information is to be determined through the latest census
statistics. State of New York Mortgage Agency, Invitation for Offers, September 15, 1978, at
2, C ("Obligations to Make New Mortgages").
117. N.Y. PuB. AUTH. LAW § 2405(3) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
118. To date seven series of bonds have been issued. The face amount of the first six
totalled $519,490,000. Letter from Joseph Cord Bosch, Associate Legislative Budget Analyst,
Ways and Means Committee, to Assemblyman Samuel Hirsch (January 14, 1980). One se-
ries of bonds was issued in 1971 and 1973, three series were issued in 1974, and one each was
issued in 1978 and 1980. Id. This amount is compared to the demand for loans in Brooklyn
in 1979 which totalled $69,279,000. See note 39 supra and accompanying text. The agency's
capability to borrow from the public at tax-exempt rates is limited to $750 million of out-
standing obligations. N.Y. PUB. AtrrH. LAW § 2407(1) (McKinney Supp. 1979). Of this
amount approximately $302 million remains outstanding. State of New York Mortgage
Agency, Official Statement Relating to $125,000,000 Series 2, Home Mortgage Revenue
Bonds, Feb. 1, 1980. SONYMA reports that 25,000 new residential mortgages have been
made available under its program. However, this figure cannot be verified. Letter from Jo-
seph Cord Bosch, Associate Legislative Budget Analyst, Ways and Means Committee, to
Assemblyman Samuel Hirsch (January 14, 1980).
Due to legislation pending in Congress, the use of tax-exempt bonds may be curbed con-
siderably. The Mortgage Subsidy Bond Tax Act of 1979, H.R. 5741, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979). This bill, known as the Ullman-Connable Bill, would repeal the exemption from
federal income tax presently given for interest paid on bonds or other interest obligations
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Thus, SONYMA has not cured the problems which are the rea-
son for its creation. It has not cured the "seriously inadequate sup-
ply of dwellings ... [for] families of low income," nor the "persis-
tence of slums and blight and the deterioration of the quality of
the environment and living conditions" for the states' residents.'1 9
Nor has SONYMA prevented "a crisis in refinancing many of the
sound, older multiple dwellings." 120
Although SONYMA has the power to prescribe the terms of new
loans made by banks,21 the agency has not, except in its latest
offering, required that loans be made in low-income neighbor-
hoods.12 2 Even if the agency had included this as one of the addi-
tional criteria which banks must meet for thirty-percent of their
new loans, it is doubtful that the criterion would have proved ef-
fective. In the typical offering, banks are given a choice in seven
additional criteria. Of these, banks need only meet one.128 For this
which are issued by a state or municipality for the purpose of providing mortgages for resi-
dential housing. Id., sec. 2, § 103A(a). See generally Keohane, The Mortgage Subsidy Bond
Tax Act of 1979: An Unwarranted Attack On State Sovereignity, 8 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 483
(1980).
119. See notes 108 and 109 supra.
120. See note 107 supra.
121. See note 112 supra.
122. State of New York Mortgage Agency, Invitation for Offers Relating to $125,000,000
Series 2, Home Mortgage Revenue Bonds, Feb. 1, 1980 [hereinafter cited as Invitation for
Offers]. See Invitation for Offers, supra. Relating to $113,350,000 Series 1, Home Mortgage
Revenue Bonds, Sept. 15, 1978 at C(1); State of New York Mortgage Agency, Prospectus
Relating to $25,000,000 Series E, General Revenue Bonds, Nov. 1, 1974 [hereinafter cited as
Prospectus]; at C; Prospectus, supra, Relating to 110,000,000 Series D General Revenue
Bonds, Nov. 1, 1974, at C; Prospectus supra, Relating to 108,000,000 Series C, General Rev-
enue Bonds, Aug. 1, 1974; Prospectus, supra, Relating to $113,490,000 Series B, General
Revenue Bonds, Oct. 30, 1973, at C; Prospectus, supra, Relating $49,650,000 Series A, Gen-
eral Revenue Bonds, Oct. 1, 1971, at C.
123. For example, in 1978 for a neighborhood to qualify one of the following characteris-
tics had to be satisfied (1) the median income in the neighborhood was at least 20% below
the median income in the area: (2) the unemployment rate in the neighborhood was at least
20% above the unemployment rate in the area; (3) a facility providing employment for at
least 20% of the working population of the neighborhood had closed within the last four
years; (4) the minority population in the neighborhood had increased by at least 20% in the
past four years; (5) multiple dwellings in the neighborhood had a vacancy rate of at least
20%; (6) more than 75% of the buildings in the neighborhood were over 50 years old; or, (7)
the total population in the neighborhood had declined at least 20% in the past seven years.
Invitation for Offers, supra note 122, Sept. 15, 1978, at C(1).
As a result, in 1978 banks could choose a wealthy historic neighborhood in which 75% of
the buildings were over 50 years old to meet the 30 percent requirement and thus could
avoid making loans to low income or redlined neighborhoods, and could recommit the other
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reason, SONYMA and the banks may be able to continue to side-
step a commitment to increase the funds available for mortgages
on low-income dwellings. Ironically, even if the Ullman-Connable
Bill, pending in Congress, is enacted, SONYMA would not be
forced to lend to low-income neighborhoods.124
The goal of increasing the supply of low-income housing and of
refinancing many old sounder dwellings is impaired by the limita-
tion placed upon loans to apartment buildings.12 5 There are two
reasons for the limitation. First, due to their size, mortgage loans
for apartment buildings would exhaust the Agency's funds too
quickly. " Second, the Agency's policy seems implicitly aimed at
increasing mortgages to one-to-two family detached dwellings, that
is, to increasing funds to middle-class and lower-middle class
neighborhoods. "' This implicit policy choice should not be auto-
matically criticized. Too often lower middle class and middle class
families are slighted by legislation. However, this is not the pur-
pose for which SONYMA was created;' 2 8 even if it were, the
70% to mortgages without meeting any agency criteria.
124. See note 118 supra. Representative Ullman stated his reasons for introducing the
bill as follows:
Despite its popularity, the use of tax-exempt revenue bonds to finance these pri-
vate investments is poor public policy. The primary goal of Federal housing policy
has been to provide shelter for low-income families. Any additional Federal resources
for housing should be for priority purposes and be subject to the discipline of the
budget process.
Use of these bonds . . . is an ineffective way to administer a housing program. In
fact, it amounts to a subsidized housing program with no exercise of any judgment or
restraint over the use of the funds by either the Administration or Congress. There
are no controls over the allocation of funds among programs nor with respect to total
budget expenditures. It funds programs for which Congress has refused to provide
through the normal budget process.
125 Cong. Rec. H2349 (daily ed. April 25, 1979). While the bill would repeal the exemption
for mortgage subsidy bonds generally, these are exceptions. The Mortgage Subsidy Bond
Tax Act of 1979 H.R. 5741, 96th Cong., 1st Seas. sec. 2, §§ 103A(b)(2)(a), 102A(b)(2)(B)
(1979). The second exception is for "qualified mortgage bonds." In the bill, a list of criteria
have been established which any bond issue must fulfill in order to meet this exception. Id.
§ 103A(c)-(1). Ironically, none of these criteria require that loans be made to low-income
neighborhoods. Id. Therefore, it can be inferred that the bill's thrust is not to force the
states to follow the federal policy of subsidizing low-income housing, but rather require
states to adhere to any supplemental housing policy which Congress wishes to implement.
125. N.Y. Pus. AUTH. LAW § 2405(3)(a)-(b) (McKinney Supp. 1970-1979).
126. See id. § 2405(3)(b).
127. See notes 123-25 supra and accompanying text.
128. N.Y. PuB. AUTH. LAW § 2401 (McKinney Supp. 1979).
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Agency's liberal range of criteria for recommiting funds defeats
even this policy. 1'
In addition, while curing redlining is not one of SONYMA's ex-
plicit purposes, such a goal is implicit. Many minority neighbor-
hoods consist of low-income families living in old multi-family
buildings, 8 which even under a strict definition of redlining would
include some stable middle-class minority families with older sin-
gle and multi-family properties.' Therefore, the Agency's stated
goals of increasing mortgage funds in general and increasing mort-
gage loans to low-income neighborhoods in particular, implicitly
includes increasing funds to redlined neighborhoods. However, be-
cause these explicit goals are not being implemented the implicit
goal of alleviating the effects of redlining has not been achieved.
The means the legislature chose to stabilize the housing industry
must also be scrutinized. The supply of funds in the housing in-
'dustry decreases when interest rates are high. High interest rates
cause an outflow of deposits, known as disintermediation, from
banking institutions. 3 2 As a result banks experience illiquidity and
thus have less funds for mortgages. 38 SONYMA, in an attempt to
counter disintermediation, will float bonds to increase the supply
of mortgage funds.' SONYMA, in essence, subsidizes the banks'
supply of mortgage funds during periods of disintermediation.
However, when one compares the dollar amount of bonds issued by
SONYMA'3 6 to the total dollar demand for loans,' and then com-
pares the amount of bonds issued by SONYMA to the net outflow
of deposits from mutuals, 117 SONYMA's shielding effect has been
negligible. One must consider then, which method, much more
massive subsidies to banks, or legislation to cure disintermediation,
in particular, legislation to change the structure of mutuals is more
129. See note 123 supra and accompanying text. Banks need meet only one of seven
criteria for 30% of their new loans, issued with the proceeds from the sale of mortgages to
SONYMA.
130. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
131. See N.Y.S. BANKING DEP'T supra note 9, at IV-E-(10), (12).
132. See notes 164, 168-70 infra and accompanying text.
133. See note 171 infra and accompanying text.
134. See N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 2401 (McKinney Supp. 1979).
135. See note 118 supra. SONYMA's first six offering totalled $519,490,000.
136. See note 79 supra and accompanying text.





A. Efforts by Community Groups
Aside from lobbying in favor of the HMDA and CRA, commu-
nity groups have made other efforts to improve the lending pat-
terns of banks in their communities. 138 The New York Public In-
terest Research Group ("NYPIRG"), after compiling a record of
mortgage investment by banks in Brooklyn,'3 9 formed a group
known as Bank On Brooklyn which after meeting with banks and
public officials14 0 reached agreement with eight savings ianks and
savings and loan associations."" These agreements made available
over fifty million dollars for mortgage lending in Brooklyn neigh-
borhoods.'4 2 Subsequently NYPIRG formed five other Bank On
Brooklyn chapters to continue monitoring investment patterns in
Brooklyn.' 3
Two groups, the Greenpoint-Williamsburgh Committee Against
Redlining and the Flatbush Mortgage Committee, began negotia-
138. See note 13 supra and accompanying text. Two YEARS LATER, supra note 13, at 4.
139. Two YEARS LATER, supra note 13, at 2.
140. Id. at 3. The first meetings between the two groups were fruitless..
A branch manager at Fulton Savings Bank told them the bank would not make loans
in their neighborhood because those areas were not considered good risks. Greater
New York Savings Bank President Jerome Maron, said that Brooklyn has "gone
down the tubes," that this bank was not interested in making loans in the borough,
and that anyone who thought otherwise was anti-capitalist .... Community mem-
bers started picketing the Flatbush Federal Savings and Loan Association, whose
president had told one applicant, "Jesus Christ himself could not get a mortgage in
Brooklyn." Id.
However, the group on East Flatbush organized by NYPIRG continued its efforts. When
banks claimed there was no local demand for mortgages, the group documented more than
twenty-four million dollars in local mortgage transactions that had taken place the previous
year. When banks claimed that no one had come to them for mortgages, the group brought
in applicants who had been rejected. When banks doubted that the group's concern was
widespread, the group gathered support from the community. Id. Finally, within a month of
each other in the spring of 1977, before the CRA was passed, Flatbush Federal, Fulton Sav-
ings and Independence Savings banks signed the first negotiated agreements between
Brooklyn lending institutions and community groups. Id. at 3-4.
141. SQUEEZING Us DRY, supra note 1, at 1.
142. Id. The Greater New York Savings Bank pledged 25 million dollars in new mort-
gage loans to New York City in 1978; the Williamsburgh Savings Bank pledged 10 million
dollars in new loans to Brooklyn in 1978. Letter from Beth Ziegler, member of Bank On
Brooklyn to Deborah Smith (August 13, 1979).
143. Two YEARS LATER, supra note 13, at 4.
1980]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. IX
tions with other banks in Brooklyn." '4 A fourth group, South
Brooklyn Against Investment Discrimination (AID), sponsored a
withdrawal campaign in which one million dollars in deposits from
the Greater New York Savings Bank's main branch was re-
moved. 14" These groups also attended and presented testimony at
the public hearings on branch and merger applications of banks
which were held by the New York State Banking Department.146
The prodigious and persistent efforts by these and other commu-
nity groups across the country make clear that it was their efforts
and the attendant publicity which not only were the cause for the
passage of the HMDA and the CRA, 14" but are also in large part
the reason these laws have been enforced at all.1"8 In addition, the
negotiations and signed agreements between these community
groups and the banks, not just enforcement of the CRA and the
144. Id.
145. Id. at 3.
146. Id, at 4. The New York City Commission on Human Rights Neighborhood Stabili-
zation Program has also challenged several bank applications. NEw YORK CITv COMMISSION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REDLINING IN THE BRONX (1978).
147. See notes 13 & 14 supra.
148. After the CRA was enacted, NYPIRG joined the Northwest Bronx Community and
Clergy Coalition to request public hearings to address the issue of how to enforce the Act. In
February 1978, the New York State Banking Department held its first public hearing for
this purpose. As a result of the attendance and testimony at this hearing, four other federal
agencies held similar hearings in New York City in April. After regulations to enforce the
CRA were promulgated, community groups continued their efforts. Two YEARS LATER,
supra note 13, at 4-5.
The Crown Heights Bank of Brooklyn chapter prevented the East New York Savings
Bank from moving a branch out of Brownsville, where it was the only savings institu-
tion. At the State Banking Board's January meeting, Superintendent Muriel Siebert
credited a letter from Downtown Bank on Brooklyn for her tie-breaking vote permit-
ting Independence Savings Bank - one of the most cooperative in making serious
commitments and carrying them out - to open a new branch. And, after three weeks
of phone calls, letters, and political pressure, the FDIC agreed for the first time to
hold a public hearing on a branch or merger application during evening hours. The
hearing dealt with the Dime Savings Bank of New York's merger application.
The picket lines, testimony, negotiations, and research came to fruition on April 22,
1979. AID and the East Flatbush Bank on Brooklyn chapter had testified against the
Greater New York Savings Bank's branch application the previous fall. AID and
Bank on Brooklyn presented (tlheir statistics, cash histories, and arguments, all of
which were heard with no more response than regulators had previously shown during
the FDIC "investigation" which concluded that Greater New York had done more
than its duty just by signing an agreement. The FDIC's rejection of the application
surprised the neighborhoods as much as it shocked the nation's banking industry.
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HMDA, are in part the cause of the banks' improved mortgage
lending records. 4
B. Efforts By the Banks
In 1977, the Savings Association League of New York State es-
tablished the Mortgage Review Fund.150 The Fund's purpose is to
review the mortgage loan applications of applicants who feel that
they were unfairly rejected by banks which participate in the re-
view program. 1 ' Member banks notify the applicant that a review
of his application is available at the time the loan is rejected.'
The application is reviewed by a regional review committee. 15 The
review committee is comprised of three savings and loan represent-
atives and three public members. 15 4 After evaluating the applica-
tion, the committee has three choices: (1) it may confirm the rejec-
tion and state its reasons, (2) recommend reconsideration of the
application, or (3) recommend submission of the application to an-
other participating member bank.'55 The review committee may
also recommend modification of the terms or conditions of the
original loan application. 56 While the Fund would not recommend
that a member institution make a high-risk loan, it tries to make
every effort to see the merit of any application. 15
7
From 1977 through 1979, the regional committees received 345
completed applications; of these the committees rejected 135 appli-
cations and recommended 165.1'" Of those recommended, the
Mortgage Review Fund Committee, the final review committee, ap-
proved 119 loans for a total of $9,009,695.19
149. See notes 141, 142, 144, 147 supra and accompanying text.
150. The Reporter Dispatch, White Plains, New York, Jan. 17, 1977, at 1, col. 1. For
other efforts by banks to improve their local communities, see HIRSCH, supra note 18, at 41.
151. MORTGAGE REVIEW FUND, 1979 Annual Report 1 (1979).
152. The Reporter Dispatch, supra note 150, at 1, col. 2.
153. Id.
154. Id. at col. 3.
155. Id. at col. 2.
156. Id.
157. MORTGAGE REVIEW FUND, 1979 Annual Report 1 (1979) (Report From The Chair-
man, I.J. Lasurdo).
158. MORTGAGE REVIEW FUND, 1979 Annual Report 7 (1979).
159. Id. at 8. Savings banks made five loans for a total of $654,000 after approval of the
Mortgage Review Committee and five loans for a total of $198,500 after recommendation by
the Regional Committee but before Mortgage Review Fund Committee action. Id. at 8-9.
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While the Fund is a useful addition to the current remedies for
discrimination, it can be improved. 60 Only persons denied a loan
by a participating mutual may apply. Applicants who have not
been allowed to file an application or have been discouraged from
filing one, or applicants who have been granted loans with discrim-
inatory terms cannot apply to the fund.' In addition, because of
the multi-tiered method of review, applications are not processed
quickly.'
IV. Disintermediation
"Intermediation" defines the function performed by financial in-
stitutions, commercial and mutual savings banks, savings and loan
associations, and insurance companies. These institutions act as in-
termediaries between savers and borrowers. 6 "Disintermediation"
occurs when savings deposits are withdrawn from financial institu-
tions and are placed in other money market instruments with in-
terest yields which are higher than those on deposits.' Individuals
finance the economy directly during these periods, rather than
through intermediary financial institutions. 65 Mutual savings
banks ("mutuals" or "thrifts"), in response to charges of redlining
and disinvestment, point to rising disintermediation. Mutuals as-
sert that due to decreasing deposits, they have less money to invest
in mortgages generally and therefore imply that they have invested
160. SCHAPER, supra note 1, at 13-44.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 45.
163. Financial institutions' investments are screened by a staff with expertise in invest-
ing. Thus, the depositor's investment involves less risk than it would if he had invested the
money directly in alternative financial markets. This staff of experts also chooses invest-
ments which, at least theoretically, yield the most profit. As a result, savings are put to their
most productive use, the economy grows, and depositors' dollars are safely invested. McKin-
ney, New Sources of Bank Funds: Certificates of Deposit and Debt Securities, 32 LAW AND
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 71 (1967).
164. CUTLER, supra note 28, at 53-54. KILDOYLE, The Financial Viability of Mutual Sav-
ings Banks in New York State, in PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD MUTUAL SAVINGS BANKS IN NEW
YORK STATE: PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 137, 150-153 (L. Lapidus ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as
KILDOYLE]; KLAMAN, Public/Private Approaches To Urban Mortgage and Housing
Problems, 32 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 250, 253 (1967) [hereinafter cited as KLAMAN]; Pro-
posed Mortgage Interest Tax Credit as part of the Financial Institutions Act: Hearing
before The Task Force on Tax Expenditures And Off-Budget Agencies of the Committee
on the Budget, House of Representatives, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 43-44 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as MITC] (statement of Dr. Patric H. Hendershott).
165. CUTLER, supra note 28, at 53.
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no less in redlined or "disinvested" areas.' 66 In this section the re-
lationship between redlining and disintermediation will be ex-
amined. Also, the causes of disintermediation and its consequences
will be discussed. In addition, the present structure of mutuals and
the effects of disintermediation on this structure will be
analyzed. 167
166. Two YEARS LATER, supra note 13, at 6. In the alternative, bankers argue that lend-
ing to these areas involves greater risks. See Two YEARS LATER, supra note 13, at 3. In
essence, under either theory, banks argue that they do not redline because by definition
redlining is based on the use of arbitrary rather than objective criteria. See note 1 supra.
To document disinvestment community groups often compare the amount of deposits
which banks receive from the community to the bank's total assets, using the amount of
deposits received from the community as a measure of the amount of money that banks
should be returning to the community. TAKE THE MONEY AND RUN, supra note 1, at 6;
SQUEEZING Us DRY, supra note 1, at 17; Two YEARS LATER, supra note 13, at 24-25.
In this context, assuming there has been an outflow of deposits from the communities
which have suffered from redlining or disinvestment, disintermediation would be a direct
answer to community groups' charges. See note 171 infra. However, there does not appear
to be a direct relationship between disintermediation and redlining. The results of correlat-
ing disintermediation and redlining are equivocal. Disintermediation should bear no logical
relationship to redlining because banks' arbitrary choices of where to invest should not be
related to the amount of mortgage funds available. However, the mixed results shown, see
note 171 infra, may be due to the enactment of the CRA and its attendant publicity. See
note 167 infra. This cannot be documented, because information on deposits by census tract
was eliminated from the G-107 Supervisory Procedure format in December 1979. Supervi-
sory Procedure, G-107, supra note 4, at Appendix 8 (12/14/79); even prior to its elimination
this information was not made public. Id., §§ 107.6, 107.8 (5/31/77). The FDIC, however,
lists deposits by branch office.
167. Banks have experienced disintermediation five times since 1960. In 1966 dis-
intermediation lasted less than a year; as a result, many banks did not show a net outflow of
deposits. KILDOYLE, supra note 164, at 152.
The following chart, see note 168 infra, shows the net growth or outflow of the fourteen
banks chosen for this study, during these periods. During the latest period, banks exper-
ienced massive losses. In January 1980, Americans invested a record $21 billion in high-
yielding money market funds while savings and loan associations attracted only $1.1 billion
in new savings. This was the lowest inflow since 1970. All of the deposits were time deposits,
i.e., six-month market certificates, 30 month certificates and large-denomination certificates
of deposit, all tied to the general market. While the $1.1 billion increase reversed the $700
million outflow of December 1979, the January 1980 increase was $3.3 billion less than that
of January 1979. The New York Times, Feb. 28, 1980, at D9, col. 1. During 1979, New York
Savings banks experienced a net outflow of five and one-half billion dollars in savings and
time deposits. In the last quarter of the year, the outflow totaled more than two billion
dollars. Statement by Muriel Siebert, New York State Superintendent of Banks, before the
Committee on Ways and Means, United States House of Representatives 2 (Jan. 29, 1980).
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A. The Present Structure of the Mutual Savings Banks
One of the causes of disintermediation is rising interest rates.16'
However, it is not rising interest rates alone, but rising interest
rates combined with a ceiling placed on interest rates for savings
deposits which cause depositors to withdraw deposits and invest in
instruments with higher yields.1 ' The second cause of dis-
intermediation as it affects mutuals, is the rate of turnover of
mutuals' assets as opposed to liabilities. The principal asset of
168.
Nrr Gaow u Ol OtFLow or DaPosrrs FROM 1960 THROUGH 1972
310 1961 1362 19113 1s4 I8 18 997 1968 IM8 1970 1971 1972
Dimeo f N.wYork N -. 
. . . . . . . 2.233,453 2,627,311 2826,237
Lincoln 84.3 602,420 636.211 067,066 728,272 788,391 853,374 939,902 1,031,257 1,049,770 1,090,043 1,184,657 193,660
Greater New
York 265,671 277,340 298.967 318,140 464.083 484.0M 616,485 570,092 616,042 648,225 928.474 1.040,987 1,142,188
Williaesburgh 802,747 819,8 652.97 807,396 976,818 1,020.849 1,072,068 1,154,069 1,221,143 1,219,678 1.250.483 1313.181 1.391.968
Brooklyn 311,671 041,134 59.935 381,86 412,42 429,428 446,391 486.9D7 628,819 1551,832 605,847 704,339 799,362
Anchor - - - - - - - 353.189 579,296 621,811 693,233 710.448
Metropolitan 114,703 109,187 170.686 188.244 209821 225,9 238,813 262.671 279,427 511,583 896,105 810,975 1,008,709
Green Point 263,092 273,218 290.70 5201833 4,99$ 367.617 386,072 426,036 466.783 499,031 529.064 586,587 643,874
independence - - - . . . . . .
Franklin 276,0186 286.107 302,46 322,900 57,68 385,3 418,854 472,203 507,723 519,268 538,020 1.008,792 1,009,043
et N-w
York 570.221 577646 998,393 624.407 659,123 678,00 689,305 718.451 734,393 722,417 725.704 767.573 865.690
Haoburn 183,37 190,153 203,878 221,686 2468.124 565,142 284,943 312,063 234.008 350.046 363,312 39,036 433AI7
Roeeovlt 183,744 180.740 194,937 199,14 212.160 222,91 235.844 204,655 275261 287,59 305.086 347,779 403,627
Dime of
Williamburgh 90,186 92,842 98.315 26, 132,923 150,06 160,253 187,327 211,04 234,290 236.701 289,432 335,414
*Metropolitan Savings Bank and Fulton Savings Bank were combined in 1969.
Dollar amounts are in thousands
Source; Statements of Conditions of the Savings Banks of the State of New York for the
years 1960-1965, 1967, 1968, 1971 complied by the New York State Banking Department.
Annual Report of the Superintendent of Banks, State of New York, 1966, 1969, 1970, 1972.
Disintermediation occurred during 1966, see note 164 supra, however, no net outflows for
the year is shown, because disintermediation commenced early in 1966 and ended prior to
the year's end.
169. MITC, supra note 164, at 47-48 (statement of Dr. Patric H. Hendershott). The ceil-
ing on deposit interest rates was first imposed in 1966. The regulation imposing the ceiling
is known as "Regulation Q." Id. at 36.
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mutuals, mortgage loans, mature more slowly than their most com-
mon form of liabilities, savings deposits. As a result, even if there
were no ceiling on savings deposits, mutuals could not raise deposit
rates quickly during periods of rising interest rates. Disintermedia-
tion is the result.17 0 The consequences of disintermediation can be
severe. One of these consequences is a shortage of credit. 7 1
As the causes of disintermediation and its consequences demon-
strate, inflation is not the sole cause of mutuals' present problems.
The structure of mutuals must be overhauled. This section will
first discuss the origins of mutual savings banks. Then its present
structure and its disadvantages will be analyzed.
Mutuals were established to encourage the working man to save
170. Id. at 41; KLAMAN, supra note 164, at:253. MITC, supra note 164, at 41 (statement
of Dr. Patric H. Hendershott).
171. MITC, supra note 164, at 41 (statement of Dr. Patric H. Hendershott); CUTLER,
supra note 28, at 53-54. Another reason for scarce credit during such periods is federal mon-
etary policy. During periods of inflation, the Federal Reserve often chooses to contract the
money supply in order to increase the prime .lending rate, thereby, raising the cost of bor-
rowing which in turn decreases demand. The New York Times, Jan. 7, 1980, at Dl, col. 4.
KILDOYLE, supra note 164, at 151-152.
If banks' illiquidity becomes severe, they are sometimes forced to sell assets at large losses
in order to maintain their operating earnings. Eight of New York City's 41 savings banks
reported losses in both operating and net income in the fourth quarter of 1979. Net income
is operating income after "nonrecurring" gains or losses such as loans that are not repaid or
sales of securities held by the bank. Another bank showed only a loss in operating income
while four others reported net losses, but operating earnings. Those reporting operating
losses were the Dime of New York, Dollar, Dry Dock, Manhattan, Williamsburgh, Lincoln,
Greenwich, Metropolitan, Greater New York, East River and Franklin. Reporting losses in
net income were Dime of New York, Williamsburgh, Lincoln, Greenwich, Metropolitan,
Greater New York and Franklin. The New York Times, Feb. 21, 1980, at Dl, col. 3 and D9,
col. 1. However, the following chart makes it clear that there is no direct correlation between
redlining and disintermediation.
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his earnings and to provide him with a source of mortgage funds.172
Mutuals' management policies have traditionally been conservative
in order to protect the depositors' savings.17 3 Unlike the holder of
stock in a commercial bank, the depositor does not make his in-
1977 1978 1979
Loans to Net Loans to Net Loans to Net
Redlined Outflow Redlined Outflow Redlined Outflow
Neighborhoods* of Deposits Neighborhoods of Deposits Neighborhoods of Deposits
Dime of New York 1,449,686 1109 1,388,477 1341 1,159,221 3150
Lincoln 802,334 - 773,452 1366 656,295 540
Greater New York 823,189 492 793,462 1873 684,531 5059
Williamsburgh 606,896 - 581,067 2255 494,538 1712
Brooklyn 594,155 690 574,840 2542 485,833 3498
Anchor 610,058 38 597,621 334 498,517 102
Metropolitan 558,686 2013 698.842 - 596,291 387
Greenpoint 502,542 - 498,273 267 436,335 80
Independence 347,735 2976 340,752 3451 299,039 6375
Franklin Sayings 311,109 72 314,065 0 257,931 28
East New York 290,056 502 264,081 0 227,507 116
Hamburg 276,107 503 263,750 53 238,817 0
Roosevelt 203,590 46 189,667 45 161,971 72
Dime of Williamsburgh 89,680 722 86,377 44 73,293 168
Dollar amounts are in thousands
See,FDIC Summary of Deposits for Kings County, June 30, 1977; June 30, 1978; June 30,
1979.
*For the purposes of this study the following neighborhoods are considered to be redlined:
Boerom Hill, Brooklyn Heights, Carroll Garden, Clinton Hills, Cobble Hill, Downtown
Brooklyn, Fort Greene, Gowanus, Crown Heights, East Flatbush, Park Slope. See Schafer,
supra note 1 at vi. See also note 167 supra.
172. CUTLER, supra note 28, at 33; Bentley and Macbeth, Mortgage Lenders and The
Housing Supply, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 167 (1972).
173. CUTLER, supra note 28 at 35.
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vestment for its potentially large profit with its concomitant risks.
Rather, the depositor opens an account because he can earn a
small profit and the deposit is virtually risk-free.1 74
In New York, mutuals are restricted in the types of assets they
are allowed to acquire. Mutuals cannot issue credit cards or make
consumer loans, and the investments they do make are re-
stricted. T1 7  As a result, while these investments carry little risk,
they also produce low yields. 17 1
Mutuals are also prohibited from issuing certain forms of liabili-
ties. Mutuals can issue time or demand deposits,1 " but, until 1973,
they could not issue bonds, notes or debentures.1 7'8 The attitudes
which have developed, and the legislation and regulations which
have been enacted to ensure the safety of depositors' funds, are
today outmoded for two reasons. First, the restrictions presently
imposed upon mutuals, on entry and expansion, on lending, on
borrowing and investing, and on deposit and loan interest rates,
are no longer necessary. The establishment of the FDIC and the
existence of comprehensive bank examination and supervision con-
ducted by federal and state agencies, make these restrictions not
only redundant but inapposite to the goal of increased mortgage
174. Id. at 73, 98.
175. The bank failures of the 1930's resulted in legislation which placed many restric-
tions on the structure and operating powers of mutuals to prevent future failures and safe-
guard depositors' funds. Id. at 72. See N.Y. BANKING LAW § 234.235 (McKinney 1971).
For example, mutuals in New York cannot invest in the obligations of a corporation, ma-
turing within 270 days, unless these have received the highest rating of an independent
rating service designated by the banking board. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 235 12-a (McKinney
1971). Similarly, mutuals cannot invest in interest-bearing obligations which are rated below
the three highest ratings of rating services designated by the bank board and the aggregate
amount invested cannot exceed one percent of the assets of the savings bank. N.Y. BANKING
LAW § 235 21-a (McKinney 1971).
176. CUTLER, supra note 28, at 106; MITC, supra note 164, at 40 (statement of Dr. Pa-
tric H. Hendershott).
177. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 234 1-a (McKinney Supp. 1979).
178. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 234 5-b (McKinney Supp. 1979). Today mutuals subject to the
regulations and restrictions of the banking board may issue notes, bonds, debentures, or
other obligations or securities subordinated to deposits. However, these securities cannot
exceed 25% of the net worth of the bank. These obligations (though not counted for the
purpose of determining 25% of the bank's net worth) are deemed to be a part of the bank's
net worth. Id. at 1. Of course mutuals cannot issue common stock. See N.Y. BANKING LAW §
234 5-b (McKinney Supp. 1979). This is the main distinction between the capital structures
of mutual and commercial banks.
124 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. IX
lending. 1 9 Additional factors which make these restrictions unnec-
essary are mutuals' use of diversified portfolios and skilled profes-
sional staffs for both borrowing and lending. 180 Second and more
important, the conservatism of mutuals' bank officers is no longer
rationally related to sound management. The criteria which mutu-
als employ to screen mortgage loan applicants illustrates this. 8'
These criteria are arbitrary, demonstrating discrimination against
individual applicants, and possibly demonstrating redlining.18 2
179. CUTLER, supra note 28, at 94-101, 104-106, 112.
180. Id. at 106.
181. SCHAFER, supra note 1, at 13-11. Bentley and Macbeth, supra note 172, at 159-163.
182. According to statistical studies, marital difficulties do not account for a large
portion of mortgage delinquencies and defaults. Nevertheless, several New Haven in-
stitutions candidly reported an interest in the steadiness and well-being of the appli-
cant's marriage. One loan officer apparently encouraged open discussion of marital
strife, while another visited applicants in their homes. Despite the difficulty of fore-
casting separation or divorce over the twenty or thirty-year period of a mortgage
agreement, marital peace was considered by one lender to be "an almost determina-
tive factor." This concern for marital stability seems to be derived from an overem-
phasis on avoiding foreclosure, which overlooks the fact that the cost of that contin-
gency can be effectively covered by adequate security.
A number of New Haven institutions mentioned an assortment of considerations
that, like marital instability, offer ample opportunity for the 'exercise of subjective
judgment and sheer guesswork. One loan officer stressed "financial character," mak-
ing it clear that in determining financial character he placed more weight on personal
characteristics than on the individual's financial record reflected in credit bureau
figures. Another institution was looking for borrowers who were "morally decent to
the best of the bank's knowledge." A third simply stated that one of the initial deci-
sions to be made about a loan applicant is "whether he is the type of person you want
coming in the door in the first place." These considerations seem geared to maintain-
ing a clubby atmosphere marked by warm relationships between the lender and its
customers. Obviously such an emphasis can easily lead to homogeneity among bor-
rowers and the exclusion of outsiders and minorities from the mortgage system.
Although relying heavily on subjective responses to the personal characteristics of
the loan applicant and other irrelevant criteria, the New Haven institutions expended
little effort in analyzing the property that would secure the loan, a major objective
element in the loan package. Many loan officers had only a general notion of where
the bulk of homes on which their institutions held mortgages were located. ...
In effect, New Haven institutions appear to view the mortgage loan as no different
from an unsecured loan. Disregarding that foreclosure need not result in financial
loss, they tend to deny loans to persons who pose any risk of default, rather than give
the loan applicant the benefit of the security.
Borrowers are not permitted to bid up the price of money; rather, the lender con-
trols the rate and rations his funds among a select group by use of such standards as
depositor status and subjective judgments as to the probability of default. The New
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Mutuals' overemphasis on protecting deposits to the detriment
of their function as mortgageesisa raises a series of questions.
Should mutuals combine mortgage and savings functions which
cause them to "borrow short and lend long?" If so, should their
structure be changed to allow for the acquisiton of new assets and
liabilities? Should mutuals modify their management policies to
make greater use of liabilities which they have the power to issue
at present, but do not often use? Should the safety restrictions on
mutual's investments be kept? Most important, one must consider
whether any of these reforms would reduce redlining and
disinvestment.
Haven institutions were apparently little influenced by a desire to earn profits or even
by a desire to make home ownership more widely available; they were motivated by a
genuine aversion to having to "take a house away from someone." As might be ex-
pected, the result of this emphasis has been extremely low rates of delinquency, de-
fault, and foreclosure, in which the institutions take some pride.
The New Haven institutions have undoubtedly paid a price in earnings for satisfy-
ing their desire for smooth sailing. Yet their placidity is socially harmful as well as
financially unproductive. Fear of taking a home away from someone may seriously
limit an institution's willingness to make home mortgage funds available in cases
where any modicum of risk is present, particularly when the loan officer is vested
with full discretion in deciding whether or not to grant the mortgage. . . .
In contrast, Los Angeles mortgage lenders gave consideration to factors which are
readily subject to quantification-income, outstanding debts, and the value of the
security-and gave no consideration to factors that were of dubious relevance (depos-
itor status), difficult to ascertain (marital stability), or hopelessly vague and subjec-
tive (good moral character). Mortgage lending in Los Angeles was bottomed on a view
of the mortgage as a security device.
Bentley and Macbeth, supra note 176, at 160-63. Two possible conclusions can be drawn
from the fact that New Haven loan officers only had a general notion of where properties,
used as securities for loans, were located, and from their use of subjective criteria to deter-
mine a loan applicant's creditworthiness. One conclusion is that these institutions do not
redline, because the location of the property is not a factor in their decisions .to lend; a
second conclusion is that these institutions do redline, because they base their cursory ap-
praisal of the property upon subjective notions of the neighborhood where the property is
located, just as they base their determinations of creditworthiness on subjective criteria.
The thesis of the Bentley and Macbeth study is that it is the form of the institution,
mutual as opposed to stock, which causes loan officers to have an exaggerated concern for
safety. Id. at 165-170.
183. Bentley & Macbeth, supra note 172, at 163-165.
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V. Proposals for Legislation
A. Amendment of the Supervisory Procedure G-107 of
the New York State Banking Department
Disclosure of the information on mortgage loans under the G-107
Procedure is far preferable to the prior methods of obtaining this
information. However, several improvements can be made in the
present regulation. Three proposals will be discussed here. First, a
proposal to require banks to file the G-107 statistics sooner than is
presently required will be analyzed. Second, a proposal to subdi-
vide the statistics for multi-family dwellings into categories of ini-
tial or first mortgages on a building, and mortgages refinancing the
building will be examined, and finally, the merits of a proposal to
make public Appendix 7 of the G-107 forms will be discussed.
An amendment requiring the early disclosure of G-107 statistics
has been proposed in the state legislature.18 4 Unfortunately, a pro-
posal requiring the banks to submit all appendices of the G-107
form sooner is not feasible. Banks do not keep records of all the
required information, and need time to compile the information
which is kept on file, in the manner proscribed by the G-107 Pro-
cedure. 58 However, because information pertaining to the number
and dollar amount of loans is kept on file by banks, the only feasi-
ble proposal is one requiring banks to submit Appendix 9 which
contains the information kept on file, to the Banking Department
sooner than is presently required. A second proposal to the present
G-107 format,15 ' would require banks to divide the data on number
and dollar amount of mortgage loans issued for multi-family dwell-
ings into two categories: initial or first mortgages on a building,
and mortgages refinancing the building. 87 Under a third proposal,
184. While banks keep records of the number and dollar amount of loans and the loca-
tion of properties which are securities for the loans on hand, banks do not keep records of
the denial or acceptance of all applications submitted. Telephone interview with William
Wheelan,, Research Director New York State Legislative Institute, Baruch College. (Sept.
12, 1980). Therefore, banks need the full nine months to gather this information and submit
it to computer programmers. Id. Also, even the data on the number and dollar amount of
loans must be "geo-coded"; that is, the address of the property must be matched to a census
tract. Id. Smaller institutions which do not have in-house computer programmers must send
the information out to data-processing firms. Id.
185. New York State Assembly Memorandum in Support of Legislation, Hirsch (1980).
186. Id.
187. See notes 56-58 supra.
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the Banking Department should require banks to make public Ap-
pendix 7V"as Appendix 7 should be made available in computerized
form without the initials of the applicant or the loan application
number. Omitting the latter information would protect the appli-
cant's right of privacy.
B. An Administrative Hearing
An individual applicant who feels he has been discriminated
against on the basis of race, sex, age or other personal criteria has
legal and administrative remedies under both state and federal
law.189 Neither federal nor state law provides a mortgage applicant
with a means of civil redress if he feels he has been discriminated
against on the basis of the location of his property. Regulations
promulgated under the Community Reinvestment Act only assuage
the general public by denying a bank's application to expand its
operations.190 A bank only suffers a quasi-criminal penalty in the
form of a fine if it violates state anti-geographic discrimination
provisions.191 Therefore, a statute which provides for civil redress
should be enacted.
One proposal which would provide for individual redress is simi-
lar in form to section 296-a of the Human Rights Law." An un-
lawful discriminatory practice is defined as discrimination by a
creditor against an applicant for credit in the "granting, withhold-
ing, extending, modifying or renewing, or in the fixing of rates,
terms or conditions of credit with respect to the purchase, acquisi-
tion, construction, rehabilitation, repair or maintenance of any
housing accomodation" in areas where the creditor maintains of-
fices." 83 In addition, under this proposal it would be unlawful for
the creditor to use any of the above methods of discrimination
against any applicant for credit "with respect to the purchase of
certificates of stock or other evidence of ownership of an interest
188. See notes 44-52, 59-62 supra.
189. N.Y. ExEc. LAW §§ 297, 297-a (McKinney 1971); N.Y. ExEc. LAW §§ 296-a, 297,
297-a (McKinney Supp. 1972-1979); 12 C.F.R. §§ 202.1, 202.2(z) (1980).
190. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2905 (Supp. I. 1977); 12 C.F.R. § 345.1-102 (1980); N.Y.
BANKING LAW § 9-f (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980); Regulation 76.1-3, supra note 75. Contra
12 C.F.R. §§ 202.1(c), 528.2 (1980).
191. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 9-f(1) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980).
192. N.Y.A. Bill Draft No. 036432 (Dec. 10, 1979) 203rd Sess. at 3.
193. Id. at 3 (emphasis omitted).
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in, and a proprietary lease from, a corporation formed for the pur-
pose of the cooperative ownership of real property.' 1 94 The propo-
sal exempts from this definition of discrimination credit extended
"pursuant to a specific public or private program designed to in-
crease, within a specific neighborhood or geographic area,"'1 5 or a
credit decision made upon the basis of "factually supportable
objective differences in the applicants' overall creditworthiness,
which may include reference to such factors as current income, as-
sets and prior credit history of such applicants, reasonable analysis
of the lending risks associated with the condition of the property
in connection with which credit is sought or reference to any other
relevant, factually supportable data."'96 However, despite these
factors, no creditor could consider in evaluating the creditworthi-
ness of an applicant, "aggregate statistics or assumptions relating
to geographic areas,' 197 but rather he may consider the "structual
condition of the property in connection with which credit is
sought."19 The definition used in this proposal is in consonance
with language used in other sections of the HRL, in contrast to the
present statute which simply prohibits geographic discrimination.
As under section 296-a, an aggrieved person can file a complaint
with the superintendent of banks in lieu of filing a complaint with
the division of human rights. 99 Pursuant to the proposal, unlike
section 296-a, any not-for-profit community, neighborhood or pub-
lic interest corporation or any civic association, claiming to be ag-
grieved by such discrimination may initially file a complaint.
200
Also, unlike section 296-a, probable cause is specifically defined.20
194. Id. at 4 (emphasis omitted).
195. Id. at 5 (emphasis omitted).
196. Id. at 5, 6 (emphasis omitted).





The Superintendent must find probable cause if the creditor does not reinvest 25%
of it's time and/or demand deposits received from the relevant county, census tract or
ZIP code area in the form of mortgage loans on properties located in that area, if it is
determined that there is a large unmet demand for mortgage loans within such area
which such creditor, despite its asset size and the total amount of its time deposits
and/or demand deposits, as compared to other banks, has not met.
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An amendment to this proposal should be added, to empower
the superintendent to enter an order in default, a provision absent
from the present statute.10 Ideally, the proposal should also re-
quire that the burden of proof be placed on the creditor.20 3 In all
other respects the proposal prescribes the same procedures and
empowers the superintendent to make the same orders as under
section 296-a.204
VI. Tax Incentives Versus Subsidies
If redlining by definition is the refusal to lend in certain neigh-
borhoods, based upon arbitrary criteria rather than upon objective
considerations of risk, 05 an incentive in the form of an income tax
credit for the interest income earned from mortgage loans, should,
theoretically, induce banks to make mortgage loans to these neigh-
borhoods. The incentive 'like other narrowly defined redlining legis-
lation, would not force banks to make high-risk loans, but instead
would induce them to abandon their bias by offering them a tax
savings.
There are two traditional criticisms of tax incentives as com-
pared to direct subsidies. The first criticism is that a tax incen-
202. See N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296-a (McKinney Supp. 1972-1979).
203. Ideally the risk of nonpersuasion should be entirely shifted to the creditor, for two
reasons. First public policy prohibits discrimination. JAMES & HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE
§ 7.8 (2d ed. 1977); CLARK, CODE PLEADING 609-10 (2d ed. 1947). In light of the statistical
conclusions of racial discrimination against individual credit applicants and that redlining
exists, see note 9 supra, public policy would be promoted by requiring a respondent/credi-
tor, to prove he has not discriminated against the complainant. Second, the creditor pos-
sesses the knowledge of whether or not discrimination has occurred. Because it is unlikely
that Appendix 7 of the G-107 Supervisory Procedure will be made public, see notes 44-47,
59-62 supra, the knowledge as to why an applicant has been denied credit remains with the
creditor and with the New York State Banking Department. JAMES & HAZARD, CIVIL PROCE-
DURE § 7.8 (2d ed. 1977); MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW 179 (1947);
MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF, 75 n.98 (1956); 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2486 (3d ed.
1940).
Partially shifting the burden of proof is already common in cases involving discrimination.
Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte - Mecklenberg Bd.
of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Dean v. Ashling, 409 F.2d 754, 756 (5th Cir. 1969); Chambers v.
Hendersonville Bd. of Educ., 364 F.2d 189, 192 (4th Cir. 1966).
204. N.Y.A. Bill Draft No. 036432 (Dec. 10, 1979); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 296-a (McKin-
ney Supp. 1972-1979). Under an alternate proposal, SONYMA would be given the authority
to conduct such conferences and hearings and to prescribe and enter orders, exactly as de-
scribed in N.Y.A. Bill Draft No. 036432. The SONYMA proposal is described in N.Y.A. Bill
Draft No. 0622410 (Dec. 10, 1979) 203rd Sess.
205. See note 1 supra.
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tive's cost is hidden;206 incentives, unlike direct subsidies, are not
written into the fiscal budget and thus legislators find incentives a
more palatable solution to social ills." 7 Legislators, under the mis-
taken impression that a tax incentive does not cost anything, have
too often seen incentives as the answer to a problem without fully
understanding its ramifications. However, federal and state legisla-
tors have become increasingly aware that tax incentives are not a
panacea for all social problems. 0 8 On the federal level, evidence of
this change in attitude is reflected in the insertion of tax incen-
tives, like direct subsidies, in the federal budget.20
The second criticism of tax incentives relates to their cost and
also to their attractiveness. Traditionally, incentives have been
preferred over direct subsidies because they require less govern-
ment interference in the private sector.2 10 However, third party in-
centives, like direct subsidies, often require the creation of a bu-
reaucracy to monitor the incentive program. 11
206. Murphy, State And Local Tax Incentives For Urban Growth: A Concept Whose
Time Never Was?, 6 FORDHAM URw. L.J. 457, 457 (1978); Spragens, The Rehabilitation of
Low-Income Rental Housing: A look at the Section 167(k) Program and the Direct Subsidy
Alternative, 28 CASE W. RES. L.J. 682, 699 (1978).
207. Murphy, supra note 206, at 457.
208. Spragens, supra note 206, at 699 n.100; P. HODGE & P. HAUSER, THE FEDERAL IN-
COME TAx IN RELATION TO HOUSING 96, 99 (1968), cited in 45 NOTRE DAME LAW. 121 n.114
(1969-1970).
209. Spragens, supra note 206, at 699 n.100.
210. See MITC, supra note 164, at 50 (statement of Dr. Edward J. Kane).
211. Spragens, supra note 206, at 700. A third-party incentive (or subsidy) is one
granted to a party other than the one who is supposed to receive the benefit. Examples are
the air pollution control tax incentive, I.R.C. § 169 (1980), the new jobs tax incentive, I.R.C.
§ 44B (1980), and the below-market-interest-rate subsidy (hereinafter cited as "BMIR")
when granted to mortgagors who are landlords. Third party incentives do not necessarily
require a greater bureaucracy to enforce them than first-party incentives. A larger bureau-
cracy is only necessary when the incentive does not directly induce the desired behavior. For
example, a business which takes a new job, or air pollution deduction or investment credit,
does so because it profits from reduced taxes; simultaneously the beneficiary, either the
general public, or the new employee benefits. However, under the BMIR, while a landlord
benefits from a reduced interest rate, tenants do not automatically benefit by having to pay
reduced rents. This assumption, however, is invalid. MITC, supra note 164, at 51. See Whit-
man, Federal Housing Assistance for the Poor: Old Problems and New Directions, 9 URB.
LAW. 14 (1977). Lower rents must be written into the legislation. 12 U.S.C. § 1715 (d)(3)
(1970) as amended by § 101, Housing Act of 1961, Pub. L. 87-70, 75 Stat. 149; Housing and
Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476, 498, (codified at 12 U.S.C. §
1701(c) (1976)). Even if lower rents are written into the legislation a supervisory bureau-
cracy would have to be created to ensure that lower rents would be charged. Cf. MITC,
supra note 164, at 53, 55-56 (statement of Dr. Edward J. Kane).
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To ensure that the redlining incentive is effective, that is, to en-
sure that the intended beneficiaries of the incentive, redlined
neighborhoods receive their benefits, a bureaucracy would have to
be created.2"
In addition to the traditional criticisms of tax incentives, there
are three other factors which must be considered before a redlining
tax incentive could be enacted. First, such an incentive must be
worded in language palatable to banks. Second, the credit would
have to be large enough to reimburse the mortgagee for any per-
ceived or real risks it would take by issuing the loan.21 Yet the
incentive should not be so large that it would create a windfall.
Third, the effects of other factors, such as the depreciation on
buildings still allowed by the federal income tax code, must be
considered.2 14
A bureaucracy would be necessary to check whether banks were requiring unnecessary
collateralization in order to obtain more credits. Cf. MITC, supra note 164 at 56. This abuse
should be no harder to detect in loans to multi-family dwellings than in loans to single-
family dwellings. First, mortgages to apartment buildings often do not amortize the entire
purchase. SCHAFER, supra note 1, at 3-82. Therefore, refinancing is often legitimate. Yet,
determining whether the second mortgage covers more than the original principal would not
be difficult. To receive the credit, a mortgagee bank would have to make a loan in a redlined
area. The beneficiary, a purchaser of real estate in the redlined neighborhood, would simul-
taneously benefit.
212. First, a bureaucracy would be necessary to define redlining and to decide which
neighborhoods are currently redlined. Addresses to which loans were made would have to be
checked at random, to determine whether loans were made to redlined neighborhoods. An-
other potential abuse of such a credit by mortgagees (or mortgagors) would be increased
collateralization. Cf. MITC supra note 164, at 55-56. Collateralization is unnecessary when
the building is used to secure a loan which is not for the purpose of financing the building's
purchase.
213. An added argument for creation of the incentive and for making it large might be
that it would increase banks' revenues, particularly in times of disintermediation. I.R.C. §
167 (1979). However, if redlining is viewed strictly as the arbitrary refusal of loans based
upon prejudice, one would be giving the banks an incentive to do what they should do with-
out inducement, thereby placing the burden on the taxpayer. Instead, the costs of solving
disintermediation should be placed upon banks as part of the free enterprise system. Obvi-
ously, the size of the incentive must also be taken into account when determining the incen-
tive's cost.
214. Depreciation, still allowed by the federal income tax code, creates rapid turnover in
the sale of multi-family buildings once the depreciation is complete; landlords have no in-
centive to invest money in repairs or rehabilitation. I.R.C. § 167 (1979). There are no statis-
tics as to the number of people denied loans because of redlining or the number who simply
have not applied for loans because of redlining. Nor are there any statistics, currently avail-
able to the public, as to the number of loan recipients given modified terms, or who are
denied refinancing due to redlining. See Supervisory Procedure G-107, supra note 4, Ap-
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Assuming a redlining incentive were enacted, serious questions
about its effectiveness would be raised. First, one would have to
consider whether a tax incentive would increase a bank's existing
participation in the mortgage market in redlined neighborhoods.21 5
Second, one must consider whether a tax credit would broaden
participation in the mortgage market by inducing institutions
which previously had not lent to redlined areas to issue mortgage
loans in these neighborhoods 2 16 A related question is whether a
tax incentive should discriminate in favor of mutuals as opposed to
commercials.2 17
Finally, after balancing all the possible costs and benefits of a
redlining incentive, one must examine the actual gains from the
incentive. Too often, even a successful tax incentive will make only
a small monetary or numerical dent in the statistics of the social
problem it was created to alleviate. 11
If a redlining incentive by most counts would be inefficient and
ineffective, it would not solve the problem of redlining, nor should
the purpose of such an incentive be to solve other problems facing
banks, such as the problem of disintermediation. Further, an in-
centive should not be created to induce the banks to do what they
already should be doing.
A. Amendment of the Law Creating the State of New
York Mortgage Agency
One must decide initially whether it is better to give a small
subsidy in the form of SONYMA funds to the banking industry as
is presently done, or to cure the problems which create the need
for the subsidy. If the subsidy is favored, then the terms pursuant
pendix 7, at 8. Appendix 7 includes a statement by the lender explaining the decision deny-
ing the mortgage application; however, this appendix is not available to the public.
215. Cf. MITC, supra note 164, at 24-25 (statement of Dr. Patric H. Hendershott).
216. Cf. id. at 50, 57-58 (statement of Dr. Edward J. Kane, and excerpt from the
JOURNAL of BANK RESEARCH, by Dr. Edward J. Kane).
217. If the purpose of the incentive is to induce mutuals to resume their traditional role
as mortgagees, then only mutuals should be given the incentive. MITC, supra note 168, at
24, 57-58 (excerpt from the JOURNAL OF BANK RESEARCH by Dr. Edward J. Kane). However,
if the purpose of the incentive is to broaden participation in the mortgage market, then
commercial banks should be given the incentive as well. Id.
218. See note 118 supra. The problem is compounded with respect to a redlined neigh-
borhood, because the necessary statistics about redlining are not available. Therefore, the
efficiency of an incentive cannot be examined.
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to which the banks are obligated to issue new mortgage loans must
be inserted directly into the statutes governing the operation of
SONYMA, or a general prescription of the types of terms allowed
should be inserted. Such a limitation should also require that a
percentage of loans be issued specifically for apartment buildings.
Ideally the amount of the subsidy should also be increased.
A better alternative is to empower SONYMA to originate low-
interest mortgage loans for low-income housing." SONYMA
would be required to gain the expertise necessary to screen loan
applications as bank staffs presently do. However, if one instead
increased the subsidy to the banking industry and restricted the
terms allowed for the new loans banks must issue the agency would
still have to increase its duties. SONYMA, to check banks' compli-
ance, would not only have to inspect banks' records, but also check
sites of properties used to secure loans.22 0 Therefore, because
SONYMA would have to increase its duties under either proposal,
the former is preferable. As a mortgage originator, SONYMA can
directly effect its stated goal of increasing the supply of low-in-
come housing. Loans to low-income areas are precisely the type
which pose a risk to the "safe and sound" operations of banking
institutions.221 Under the alternative proposal, as a subsidizer of
the banking industry, SONYMA would instead jeopardize the safe
and sound operations of the banks by forcing them to make just
such high-risk loans. Therefore, the proposal empowering
SONYMA to originate mortgages should be enacted, even if some
of the proposals to cure disintermediation, discussed below, are en-
acted as well.
In addition, SONYMA should be allowed to make loans to those
corporations who want to buy or build apartment buildings with-
out the present limitations.2 2 Such a proposal should also require
that benefits be passed along to tenants; rent ceilings enforceable
by city or state rent agencies would have to be included in any
multi-dwelling mortgage. Either proposal should also include crite-
ria that a certain percentage of SONYMA's available funds go to
areas redlined in prior years or that a certain percentage of the
219. N.Y.A. 12217, § 66, 203rd Sess. (1980); N.Y.A. 12156, § 86, 203rd Sess. (1980).
220. See note 211 supra.
221. See notes 69, 166 supra.
222. N.Y. PuB. AUTH. LAW § 2405(3)(a)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1970-1979).
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banks' new commitments go to these areas.
VII. Proposals to Modify the Structure of Mutual
Savings Banks
Several proposals have been suggested to expand the powers of
mutuals and to make greater use of existing powers. Use of these
powers would enable mutuals to maintain greater liquidity in times
of disintermediation."' These proposals are also advantageous be-
cause they represent permanent organic reforms rather than a
temporary fiscal change such as the tax incentive discussed
above."4 In the past, some commentators have argued that infla-
tion is cyclical and thus its adverse effects would be neutralized
over time; therefore, organic changes in mutuals' structure were
not necessary." 5s  However, today the opposite is true.21 Thus a
temporary subsidy is no longer an appropriate remedy.17 Three
proposals to modify the structure of mutuals will be discussed: (1)
the use of variable rate mortgages ("VRM's") and price-level ad-
justed mortgages ("PLAM's"); (2) the issuance of credit cards and
consumer loans; (3) the use of notes, debentures, bonds and mort-
gage-backed securities.
A. Variable-Rate and Price-Level Adjusted Mortgages
A mortgage instrument has three parameters: the term or con-
tract period (which can be further subdivided into the amortiza-
tion and interest periods), the principal, and the percentage of in-
terest, or interest rate, to be paid upon the principal." 8 In the
standard mortgage instrument, the interest rate and the ratio of
223. See notes 238, 247, 251 infra.
224. See notes 205-217 supra.
225. Hyer and Kearl, Legal Impediments to Mortgage Innovation, 6 REAL EST. L.J. 211,
215-216 (1977-1978).
226. Hyer and Kearl, supra note 225, at 216-17. Inflation is both foreseeable and perma-
nent, not a temporary abnormality. See note 167 supra. The increase in the rate of inflation
in recent years has caused liquidity crises for a number of mutuals. See note 171 supra.
Even if inflation is considered "cycical," it requires long-term structual changes. Further-
more, the real cost of mortgages over times has not changed. Hyer and Kearl, supra note
225, at 217.
227. Hyer and Kearl, supra note 225, at 217.
228. Id. This is not the case with a "balloon" mortgage where amortization is not com-
pleted when the term of the loan is finished; instead the loan is renegotiated. See TAKE THE
MoNmy AND RUN, supra note 1, at ii.
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payments of principal and interest is fixed over the term of the
contract.229 Thus the borrower pays the last interest payment on
the same date he completes the amortization for the loan.2 0 Under
a variable-rate mortgage the interest rate is not fixed.281 Rather
than choosing to vary the term or principal parameters by length-
ening the term or amortization periods, or increasing the principal,
proponents of the VRM advocate changing the relationship be-
tween the term of the mortgage and the amortization period. 2 2
The mortgage becomes a series of shorter-term contracts for which
the interest rate may or must be renegotiated. "'
While other mortgage market participants, such as commercial
banks and credit unions, can make VRM loans as long as state
laws do not prohibit them, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
prohibits mutual savings banks and savings and loan associations
from making such loans.2 " At present VRM's are in effect in some
states and abroad. In New York, their use by mutuals is prohib-
ited'3 6 but several proposals have been submitted to the state legis-
lature which would allow their use.37 The main advantage of a
VRM is that it allows a mutual to maintain an interest rate on
mortgage instruments competitive with short-term interest
rates. 3
However, there are several obstacles which must be overcome





234. Werner, Usury and the Variable-Rate Mortgage, 5 REAL EST. L.J. 155 (1976-1977).
235. Strum, New York State Bar Association Real Property Law Section: Comm. 5533
on Mortgages, Report on the Variable Rate Mortgage, 45 N.Y. ST. B.J. 112 (1973).
236. See N.Y. BANKING LAW §§ 235(6)(b), 380(1)(a)(4) (McKinney Supp. 1979). No such
restriction is placed upon mortgages made by commercial banks. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 103
(McKinney 1958), or insurance companies, N.Y. INS. LAW § 81 (McKinney Supp. 1979).
237. First, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board ("FHLBB") proposed a regulation. 37
Fed. Reg. 16201 (Aug. 11, 1972), which was withdrawn in 1973. 38 Fed. Reg. 17023 (June 28,
1973). The same proposal was revived and withdrawn again, 40 Fed. Reg. 6870-74 (Feb. 14,
1975); 40 Fed. Reg. 51414-15 (Nov. 5, 1975). The Dime Savings Bank of New York recently
introduced a renegotiable rate mortgage ("RRM") in the New York metropolitan area. N.Y.
Times, Sept. 21, 1980, at § 8, 1, cols. 1-2, 4, col. 1. Bills allowing mutuals to issue VRMs
were introduced in the state legislature during its last session. N.Y.A. 12156 § 51, 203 Sess.
(1980); N.Y.A. 12217 § 45, 203 Sess. (1980); N.Y.S. 10191 § 48, 203 Sess. (1980). N.Y.A.
12217 passed in part in the Assembly. Only the Senate passed N.Y.S. 10191.
238. Hyer and Kearl, supra note 225, at 218.
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before VRM's can be implemented in New York. Laws prohibiting
usury present the most commonly cited legal problem .23  The sec-
ond major problem in implementing VRM's is defining a suitable
index to which to tie the mortgage loan's interest rate.4
There are several additional problems with VRM's as well.
Mutuals may also lose the stability on long-term fixed rates and of
course may lose money when interest rates are low. 241
Whether VRM's can generate funds sufficient to ease the conse-
quences of disintermediation is questionable. First, VRM's may in-
crease transaction costs, thus decreasing the funds saved through
the use of VRM's.2 ,2 Also unanswered is the amount of additional
income VRM's would provide. The utility of VRM's as a method of
eliminating either disintermediation itself or its adverse effects has
239. Strum, supra note 235, at 117; Werner, supra note 234, at 155; Hyer and Kearl,
supra note 225, at 122. In New York an individual can be charged no more than 18% inter-
est on any consumer loan. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 21 (McKinney Supp. 1979). Several
arguments to avoid the charge of usury have been advanced. Hyer and Kearl, supra note
225, at 223-26. Strum, supra note 235, at 117-18. Werner, supra note 234, at 156-62. How-
ever, none of these arguments is persuasive. Moreover, the limited purpose of such argu-
ments is to provide a defense for banks during litigation.
240. Due to the volatility of interest rates, a conservative measure should be used.
Strum, supra note 235, at 113. Otherwise, frequent changes in the rate could add costs for
both the lender and borrower, in the form of increased services required to continually rene-
gotiate the loan. Id. In addition to the frequency of the change in interest rates, the percent-
age of change must be considered; if it is large, it can, of course, cause a burden on the
borrower, particularly if his income is fixed, or at least not rising as rapidly as the interest
rate. Id. at 117. Lenders may wish to restrict the percentage of change in the interest rate or
set a minimum and maximum rate. Id. at 115. Several indices have been suggested. Id. at
113-15. The best of these is the national mortgage rate. The Federal Home Loan Bank
Board and the Federal Housing Authority publish such indices. While the national rate
might not reflect changes in the local mortgage money markets, it is an objective rate and
one that could be easily checked by the mortgagor. Id.
241. Mutuals will lose the stability they gained by having fixed long-term investments in
their portfolios. Strum, supra note 235, at 117. If all institutions do not use the VRM instru-
ment, an institution which offered only VRM's might lose customers. Id.; LASDON, Invest-
ment and Finance: Variable-Rate Mortgages, 87 BANKING L.J. 762 (1970). When interest
rates are low, banks would have to accede to customers' demands for fixed rate loans,
Strum, supra note 235, at 120, and may also be forced to give an initial discount to make
the mortgage more attractive, Lasdon, supra, at 762, or covenant to maintain the current
rate on other mortgages. Strum, supra note 235, at 121. Statutes which require banks offer-
ing VRM instruments to decrease as well as increase mortgage interest rates, see, e.g., CAL.
CIv. CODE § 1916.5(a)(1) (West Supp. 1980), while the liabilities of mutuals remain fixed,
that is, if mutuals cannot correspondingly decrease interest paid on savings deposits, the
utility of a VRM may be lost.
242. See note 248 supra.
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not been shown. In Great Britain, where sixty percent of all mort-
gages are VRM's, mortgage lending institutions have not been able
to eliminate the effects disintermediation has during inflationary
periods.2 4s The use of the VRM to redistribute income to deposi-
tors is suspect. Assuming no ceiling on deposit interest rates were
to exist, it has not been demonstrated that mutuals could increase
their revenues through the use of VRM's alone; enough to offer
interest rates on deposits competitive with those on other invest-
ments. Therefore, VRM's alone may not be a practicable solution
for preserving the assets of mutuals during periods of inflation.
An alternative to the VRM instrument is a price-level adjusted
mortgage instrument. Under a PLAM the principal rather than the
interest rate or term varies, so that the outstanding principal is
readjusted periodically to reflect the "real" value of the outstand-
ing debt. The index by which the changes will be measured is spec-
ified in the contract, as in a VRM instrument.2 4  An important
practical consideration with the PLAM, as with the VRM, is which
index to use; several have been suggested.24 ' Most of the problems
which would arise when implementing PLAM's are the same as
those that would arise when implementing VRM's.2 4' However,
there is one major advantage of the PLAM as compared to the
VRM. Unlike the VRM, the PLAM may be advantageous to both
243. Lasdon, supra note 241, at 763.
244. Hyer and Kearl, supra note 225, at 218.
245. The consumer price index, and several wage-income indices have been suggested.
Id. The consumer price index has been suggested because it is objective. It is an index es-
tablished by the federal government, not one established by an individual bank. Also, the
public can obtain the consumer price index easily and can understand it. Strum, supra note
235, at 116.
246. As with the VRM there are several problems with the PLAM. First, some courts
may consider an adjustment of the principal as additional interest and thus usurious.
Strum, supra note 235, at 118. However, because the currency is being lent at its real value,
it has been held not to be usurious. Id. A second legal prohibition in some jurisdictions is
compounded interest. Hyer and Kearl, supra note 225, at 226-27. However, if a court con-
siders a PLAM as several separate contracts with an option for the borrower to immediately
pay the increase in principal, it might be held legal. Id. at 227-28. As suggested earlier in the
discussion of VRM's, it would be more sensible to amend the laws proscribing usury and
compound interest. See note 239 supra and accompanying text. A third obstacle may possi-
bly arise in implementing PLAM. They may be void for reasons of public policy. Strum,
supra note 235, at 116 nn.13, 15-16. Again, several arguments to avoid this interpretation
have been suggested. Hyer and Kearl, supra note 225, at 230-31.
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the borrower and the lender.'4 7
VRM's alone will probably not bring in enough revenues to
maintain mutuals' cash flow during periods of inflation.2 4  PLAM's,
because they are more palatable to borrowers, may be more widely
used by mutuals and thus bring in greater revenues. However,
VRM's or PLAM's alone will probably not solve all of a bank's
cash flow problems."8
B. Proposals to Expand Mutuals' Power to Lend to
Consumers
A second series of proposals recommends enhancing the lending
powers of mutuals' in order to protect against the adverse effects
of disintermediation. The proposals most often mentioned would
allow mutuals to issue credit cards and to make consumer loans.2 50
There are several advantages to such proposals. First, allowing
mutuals to invest in shorter-term assets such as consumer loans
with higher yields would enable mutuals to better match the terms
and yields of their liabilities. Thus mutuals could maintain a more
constant level of operating funds, even during periods of infla-
247. Hyer and Kearl, supra note 225, at 237-38. Under a standard instrument, the lender
charges a higher fixed interest rate to account for inflation; thus, while the payment remains
the same over the term of the mortgage, the biggest burden for a young upwardly mobile
household whose income has not yet risen, is during the early years of the mortgage. Id. at
218. Under a PLAM, the payment rises with the rate of inflation; thus, the initial payment
will be the same regardless of the rate of inflation and thus, lower than the initial payment
under a standard mortgage contract under the same conditions. Id. That is, the lender will
charge the real value of the principal and charge for the present-discounted value in either a
standard or VRM instrument, but in addition, charge a higher interest rate to reflect the
rate of inflation. Ideally, a PLAM could also be adjusted to reflect the income of an older
household with payments starting above the real rate of payment and later falling below it.
Id. at 219.
248. See note 243 supra.
249. Id.
250. N.Y.A. 12156 § 30, 203rd Sess. (1980); N.Y.A. 12217 § 30, 203rd Sess. (1980); N.Y.S.
10191 § 30, 203rd Sess. (1980). See Lapidus, New Powers for Mutual Savings Banks, PUBLIC
POLICY TOWARDS MUTUAL SAVINGS BANKS IN NEW YORK STATE: PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 229
(1974); Klaman, supra note 164, at 258. Pursuant to recent federal legislation, state-charted
banks may apply for federal charters. Financial Institutions Regulatory Control and Interest
Rate Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 5108, 12 U.S.C.
§ 27 (Supp. II 1978)). Under federal legislation enacted this year, federally chartered sav-
ings and loan associations and mutual savings banks are allowed to issue credit cards as
proposed here. Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 248 (1980)). Therefore a state-chartered mutual savings bank may now apply for a federal
charter and thus gain the power to issue credit cards.
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tion.2e" The second possible advantage to such proposals would be
the broadening of the mortgage market among more financial insti-
tutions.252 Commercials might invest more heavily in mortgages as
mutuals become more competitive in the credit card and consumer
loan markets. The burden of long-term mortgages would then be
spread through a wider market.258
However, mutuals should not be allowed to exercise all the pow-
ers which commercials now exercise.2" Proposals which recom-
mend that mutuals be given all the same powers as commercials
have several faults. First, if mutuals were allowed to service corpo-
rate as well as consumer customers, funds would be diverted from
the mortgage market.'5 5 Corporate customers, because of their su-
perior bargaining position,256 and their ability to bring mutuals
more business,57 will divert substantial funds earmarked for mort-
gage loans.
Unfortunately, studies which analyze these proposals do not con-
sider the possible diversion of funds within the consumer market
from mortgage loans to consumer loans and credit cards. 58 Con-
sumer loans and credit cards provide higher yields,5 9 and are less
labor-intensive.'" In other words, funds within the consumer mar-
251. MITC, supra note 164, at 39; Klaman, supra note 164, at 258. In addition to em-
powering banks to invest in short term assets with higher yields, proposals to remove inter-
est ceilings have been made. It is argued that these additional powers would help mutuals
reduce disintermediation during times of inflation. MITC, supra note 164, at 43.
252. Klaman, supra note 164, at 257.
253. Id.
254. Lapidus, supra note 250, at 246.
255. N.Y.A. 12156 § 29, 203rd Sess. (1980); N.Y.A. 12217 § 29, 203rd Sess. (1980); N.Y.S.
10191 § 29, 203rd Sess. (1980). Klaman, supra note 164, at 257; Lapidus, supra note 250, at
239-245, 246.
256. Lapidus, supra note 250, at 240-246. A businessman's demand for service from any
particular bank is more elastic than a consumer's. His needs are not based upon the conve-
nience of a bank's location as is the case with consumer's. The market for the business
customer is more competitive, forcing banks to give such customers preferrential treatment.
Lapidus, supra note 250, at 240-41.
257. Id. at 240-41. Corporate customers provide additional business and are a source of
deposits. Id.
258. See generally L. LAPIDUS, S. CUTLER, P. KILDOYLE & A. CASTRO, PUBLIC POLICY To-
WARD MUTUAL SAVINGS BANKS IN NEW YORK STATE; PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE (1974).
259. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 501(1) (McKinney 1978); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 14-a(2)(a)-
(b), (10) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980).
260. See Bentley and Macbeth, supra note 172, at 161-64. A bank need only investigate
the credit rating of an applicant for a personal loan or a credit card; however, a bank must
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ket may be diverted from mortgage loans to personal loans. The
failure to account for this possibility may be a major flaw in cur-
rent analysis which detracts from the recommendations made by
these studies.
C. Proposals to Expand the Use of Debt Securities
Another means to increase mutuals' funds for mortgages would
be to expand their use of liabilities other than savings deposits. In
1973, the New York State Banking Law was amended to give
mutuals the power to issue notes, bonds, debentures, or other obli-
gations or securities subordinated to deposits. Such securities can-
not exceed twenty-five percent of the net worth of the savings
bank issuing them, and their issuance is subject to the regulations
and restrictions of the banking board."1
Borrowing, other than short-term borrowing by mutuals, has tra-
ditionally been discouraged.26' Debt securities such as debentures
were last issued in large quantities by commercial banks in the
1930's during a time of widespread bank failures. 68 The deben-
tures were sold to a corporation created by Congress to assist the
recovery of the banks; these debentures were retired as banks
reached financial stability.2' 4 For this reason the use of debentures
by commercials has often been associated with economic crisis
both by the general public and by the agencies which regulate
banks.2 "
In the past, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem took the position that debentures involved considerable risk to
issuing banks during periods of low earnings.2" The Board's fear of
risk is applicable to present-day mutuals as well, because the
overuse of debentures could also cause mutuals to fail. However,
since the early 1960's commercials have used debt securities as an
additional source of financing with some success." 7 Therefore, a
(or should) examine the property in the case of a secured loan such as a mortgage. Id.
261. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 234 (5-b) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980).
262. See MITC, supra note 164, at 47-48.
263. McKinney, supra note 163, at 86.
264. Id. at 85. Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act, Pub. L. No. 2, 47 Stat. 5 (1932)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 82, 601 (1976)) (repealed in part).
265. Id. at 86-9.
266. Id. at 87-8.
267. Id. at 90-1.
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change in attitude towards the use of these debt securities may
also prove fruitful to mutuals. Debentures can be used as an addi-
tional source of funds or, in their subordinated form, as an addi-
tional form of capital.' "
Another form of security, suggested to ease mortgage originators'
liquidity problems is the mortgage-backed security. There are two
forms of mortgage-backed securities, certificates which evidence
ownership directly or indirectly in a mortgage loan or pool of mort-
gage loans, and an obligation secured, directly or indirectly by a
single mortgage loan or by a pool of loans.269 Such an obligation
may also be secured by a guarantee which is secured, directly or
indirectly, by a mortgage loan or pool of loans.27 0
The use of mortgage-backed bonds has grown rapidly since 1970
when they were first introduced into the financial markets. 17 1 Com-
mercial banks were the first financial institutions to issue these se-
curities.272 In 1975 the Federal Home Loan Bank Board amended
its regulations to allow eligible insured savings and loan associa-
tions to issue mortgage-backed bonds.2
Additional uses of mortgage-backed securities have been sug-
gested. First, federal credit unions which were given the power to
make thirty-year mortgage loans in 1977, could use these securities
to avoid potential liquidity problems.21 4 Second, commercial banks
could also use mortgage-backed securities to re-enter the mortgage
market or to expand their existing long-term mortgage lending be-
cause these securities allow investments in mortgage loans to be
converted into cash .27 These suggested uses, to avoid illiquidity
and to either re-enter or expand existing participation in the mort-
gage market, also make mortgage-backed securities ideal vehicles
for mutuals.
268. Id. at 85. To counter the traditional fears concerning the issuance of debentures
and other debt securities, mutuals should be required to join the Federal Reserve System
and to keep reserves as commercials presently are required to do. McKinney, supra note
163, at 85.
269. Klaman, supra note 164, at 259-260; Strine, New Commercial Devices-Mortgage-
Backed Securities, 13 REAL PROP. PROB. AND TR. J. 1012 (1980).
270. Strine, supra note 269, at 1012.
271. Id. The last widespread use of mortgage-backed bonds was in the 1920's.
272. Id.
273. 40 Fed. Reg. 17,982 (1975).
274. Strine, supra note 269, at 1044.
275. Id.
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At present, however, mortgage-backed securities as issued in
large denominations, are not intended to attract the sophisticated
individual investor.' 7 ' Yet, disintermediation, caused by an outflow
of deposits from savings banks into money market instruments,
demonstrates the need for mortgage-backed securities competitive
with other securities.27  Such a consumer-type, mortgage-backed
security could be marketed in a variety of denominations and ma-
turities like other open market securities.2 78
It has been argued that if mutuals are allowed expanded powers,
and thus to compete directly with commercials, they should no
longer retain the advantages given in the past to remain "competi-
tive" with commercials.' In other words, mutuals should be re-
quired to keep reserves.' The tax advantages mutuals now receive
should be discontinued,28 1 and the higher interest rate mutuals can
pay for savings deposits should also be eliminated.' 8' Last, some
commentators advocate the restructuring mutuals into stock cor-
porations .2a The arguments that mutuals should not retain these
advantages, are based on the notion of "being fair" to commercials,
not upon logic or statistical analysis.'8 ' Implicit in these arguments
is the assumption that all the proposals analysed here, will produce
a substantial increase in revenues for the mutuals.'a This increase
must be large enough to allow mutuals to maintain their cash flow
during periods of disintermediation, but in spite of the loss of all
276. Klaman, supra note 164, at 259.
277. Id.
278. Id. Such a mortgage-backed security should also be designed to minimize competi-
tion with savings deposits. Id. The last organic change in the structure of mutuals which has
been suggested is also the most radical. It has been suggested that mutuals convert into
stock organizations similar to commercials and some savings and loan associations. Lapidus,
supra note 250, at 231, 259. The advantage of such a suggestion is that it would separate the
risks involved when banks borrow short-term or issue debt securities. Furthermore, it would
separate the risks of illiquidity associated with the banks' role as mortgagee and its role as a
depository for savings. See text and notes accompanying notes 288-305 for a discussion of
the use of credit unions, a stock form of organization, as mortgage originators in redlined
areas.





284. See notes 279-283 supra.
285. See notes 246, 250, 251, 255, 259 supra.
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advantages they previously enjoyed. If this assumption is not true,
mutuals will be forced to engage almost exclusively in short-term
lending as commercials presently do. If this is the case, the pur-
pose of all the proposals discussed above, to pour more funds into
the mortgage market, would be defeated.
The above proposals are not founded on the premise that mutu-
als which are more competitive will be less prejudiced. It is argua-
ble that in a system of perfect competition, more loans will be
made to redlined areas. 86 In a truly competitive marketplace,
somebody will enter the market for mortgage loans to redlined
areas because there is a profit to be made.87 However, redlining in
the strict sense is irrational; considerations of risk versus profit
does not exist within the realm of irrational thinking.
Instead, a premise of this Comment is that disintermediation in-
directly affects redlined areas by decreasing the amount of funds
which mutuals have to lend. The above remedies, expansion of
mutuals' powers to issue VRM's, PLAM's, credit cards, consumer
loans, and to maker greater use of existing powers to issue debt
securities will maintain mutuals' liquidity during periods of dis-
intermediation without sacrificing the goal of safeguarding deposi-
tors funds.
VIII. Community-Based Federal Credit Unions
Community-based federal credit unions have also been proposed
as a means of solving the problems of redlining and disinvest-
ment.28 8 Under federal law, a credit union is defined as a "coopera-
tive association organized . . . for the purpose of promoting thrift
among its members and creating a source of credit for provident
and productive purposes."' 89 Credit unions were intended by Con-
gress to provide a source of credit for persons of "small means"
who are unable to borrow from conventional bank institutions. 9
286. See P. SAMUELSON, EcONoMicS 62-63 (9th ed. 1973).
287. Id.
288. Financial Reform Act of 1976: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Financial
Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 1 at 185
[hereinafter cited as Financial Reform Act of 1976].
289. Federal Credit Union Act of 1934, ch. 750, § 101 formerly § 2, 48 Stat. 1216, renum-
bered and amended Pub. L. 91-468 §§ 1(2), 2, 84 Stat. 994, 1015 (1970) (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1752(1) (1976)).
290. S. Rep. No. 555, 73d Cong., 2d Seass. 1 (1934); 78 Cong. Rec. 12223 (1934).
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Credit unions have the power to make loans for the purchase of
residential real estate, 91 which must serve as the principal place of
residence for the credit union member.292 The union is obligated to
extend credit up to and often in excess of the member's sharehold-
ings.293 Also, the rate of interest on such loans may not exceed one
percent per month on the unpaid balance of the loan, including all
applicable service and administrative charges.294
Like mutuals, credit unions pool the small savings of members in
order to obtain funds for use as credit.295 Unlike mutuals, federal
credit unions issue shares to members;296 these members, also un-
like depositors, have a "common bond of occupation, or associa-
tion," or belong to a group "within a well-defined neighborhood,
community or rural district."2 9 The purpose of this requirement is
to create a group whose members are either already familiar with
each other's reputations and thus would be willing to work to-
gether, or who all have a shared interest in their community. 298
The irony of this proposal is that credit unions will simply re-
place the traditional savings and lending functions of mutual sav-
ings banks.299 However, in such credit unions, unlike in mutuals,
the savings and lending functions are separated; members of the
union would not necessarily have greater control of the unioi be-
cause of their ownership as shareholders than depositors have over
mutuals300 However, members might be able to obtain credit more
easily because the union's credit committee would not stress overly
conservative management policies for the sake of protecting depos-
its.301 The union's main purpose in this proposal would be to ex-
tend credit for the purpose of rehabilitating a community by al-
291. 12 U.S.C. § 1757(5).
292. Id.
293. Id. § 1757.
294. Id. § 1757(5)(A)(vi), (vii). This rate was raised to 1.25% per month by the Deposi-
tory Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 86-822.
295. NATIONAL CREDIT UNION ADMINISTRATION, Changes in Federal Credit Union Com-
mon Bond Policy, A Policy Analysis: 1965-1974, 2, Appendix A (July 1975).
296. 12 U.S.C. § 1757 (1976).
297. Id. § 1759.
298. See D. MELVIN, R. DAVIS & G. FISHER, CREDIT UNIONS AND THE CREDIT UNION IN-
DUSTRY: A STUDY OF THE POWERS, ORGANIZATION, REGULATION AND COMPETITION 43 (1977).
299. See note 172 supra and accompanying text.
300. See note 182 supra.
301. See note 173 supra and accompanying text.
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lowing the purchase of properties which traditional lending
institutions will support.302
There are three major limitations to this proposal as well as sev-
eral problems. Initially, individuals may experience difficulty ob-
taining enough capital to establish the credit union, and maintain-
ing liquidity once the credit union is established. However, these
problems are surmountable. 803 Aside from the problems of capitali-
zation and liquidity, there are three major limitations on this pro-
posal. First, because federally chartered unions may only make
loans for the purchase of properties which are the principal resi-
dences of the union members buying them, loans for the purchase
of apartment buildings are probably excluded.304 Even if this were
not so, the requirement that the loan be a first lien, would prevent
loans refinancing the purchase of apartment buildings.30 5 Second,
credit unions, like all financial institutions, could not make high-
risk loans and still expect to remain solvent. Therefore, the use of
credit unions in low-income neighborhoods is not feasible. Third,
the proposal presupposes a cohesive community. Union members
would have to have either enough confidence or financial ability to
patiently support the union in its efforts to obtain additional funds
and expertise. This presupposition may overwhelm reality, but
without it the concept is of little use.
302. FINANCIAL REFORM ACT OF 1976, supra note 288, Statement of Credit Union Na-
tional Association, Inc. at 156-60.
303. Although credit unions typically obtain initial capital from member shares, such
shares may have a par value of as little as five dollars. 12 U.S.C. § 1757 (1976). Under the
present law, a credit union may then obtain additional funds in two ways. First, once a
charter is obtained, the union may join the National Credit Union Central Liquidity Facility
with only a $50 subscription. Id. § 1795(a)-(i). The union can then apply for credit to meet
its liquidity needs. Id. § 1795(e). Second, to raise additional funds the union can sell its
mortgages in the secondary mortgage market and can then invest in United States securities
or in bank deposits of other financial institutions. Id. § 1757(7)(B)-(E). Three additional
means of obtaining funds have also been proposed. First, the common bond requirement
should be construed liberally to allow neighborhood businesses as members; they can pro-
vide additional funds. Financial Reform Act of 1976, supra note 288, at 88-89. Second, mu-
tual and commercial banks could be required to extend credit to these unions. Id. at 137-39.
Third, federal housing programs should be amended to allow funding of community credit
unions. Id. at 136.
304. See note 292 supra and accompanying text.
305. Id. § 1757(5)(A)(i).
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IX. Conclusion
The host of state and federal statutes and regulations enacted to
remedy the problems of redlining and disinvestment have only
been partially effective, and state legislation to remedy the lack of
funds for low-income housing has been wholly ineffective. In addi-
tion, state legislation to subsidize banks during periods of dis-
intermediation has satisfied only a small amount of the demand for
mortgage funds.
Legislation to prohibit redlining, like legislation prohibiting any
type of discrimination, is easy to enact but difficult to enforce. The
goal of such legislation is not merely to order the economy, but to
compel changes in attitudes, often long-set biases. Realistically,
however, while discrimination of any kind should not be tolerated,
it can never be truly "prohibited." Legislation mandating reinvest-
ment also presents the larger question of the private sector's obli-
gation to society. The CRA, though not highly successful, is an ad-
mirable attempt to answer the question. Last, the perennial
problem of housing the poor is one which should be squarely con-
fronted by state legislatures. While the likelihood of more govern-
ment spending for low-income housing is not great,806 private in-
dustry should not be expected to tackle this problem.
Nevertheless, the private sector in combination with SONYMA,
must not be allowed to evade the purpose of legislation enacted to
help house the poor.
While these laws in themselves may not be successful, their en-
actment and enforcement at least represents a consensus that the
practice of redlining should not be allowed, and that banks should
reinvest in local communities where they are located. The enforce-
ment of the present CRA regulations and the equivalent state reg-
ulations must be continued, but if investment patterns remain the
same in the future, stiffer sanctions should be imposed. In addi-
tion, the proposals recommended in this Comment, if enacted,
would represent a consensus that the private sector should solve
the problems of disintermediation and that the public sector
should attempt to solve the problem of housing the poor. First,
mutuals should be empowered to issue new forms of assets and ia-
306. See generally Kowinski, The Squeeze of the Middle Class, N.Y. Times, July 13,
1980 § 6 (Magazine) at 27, 49, cols. 1-2, 59, cols. 2, 60, col. 3-4.
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bilities. These organic changes, if enacted together rather than sin-
gly, should increase mutuals' available mortgage funds. Second,
legislation empowering SONYMA to originate mortgage loans for
low-income housing should be enacted; while the subsidy which
SONYMA would issue for low-income housing will never be
enough, it should at least be efficient. Third, specific reforms in
existing legislation should be made. Legislation which better de-
fines redlining and gives mortgage applicants a civil remedy should
be enacted, and existing regulations should be amended to require
the disclosure of more detailed mortgage statistics sooner than is
presently required.
Deborah A. Smith

